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INTRODUCTION

HIS paper sets itself two tasks: (1) to introduce lawyers to important recent developments in epistemology; and (2) to show
lawyers and philosophers how these developments provide a conceptual foundation for some familiar approaches to problems from
the law of evidence. The developments in epistemology have not,
to date, been much noted in legal scholarship, despite their importance in philosophy and their coincidence with some widely shared
approaches to evidence scholarship. This may partly explain-or
perhaps is partly explained by-the unfortunate fascination in
some quarters of the legal academy with "postmodern" conceptions of knowledge and truth, conceptions notable for their
superficiality and for the fact that almost no philosophers subscribe
to them.' It may also partly explain-or be explained by-the even
more common search by the legal professoriat for the algorithm
that, a priori, provides answers to important legal questions. In the
field of evidence, while there is some interest in post-modem epistemology,2 more typical is either the search for the appropriate
algorithm, such as Bayesian decision theory3 or more recently mi-

1 Postmodernists are typically skeptical about the possibility of objective truth, as
well as our capacity to find objective truth in the world. Such an outlook is
remarkably useless for evidence law, as discussed in Mirjan Damagka, Truth in
Adjudication, 49 Hastings LJ. 289 (1998). Postmodern conceptions of truth and
knowledge are patiently and clearly criticized in Alvin I. Goldman, Knowledge in a
Social World 9-40 (1999).
2 See, e.g., Bernard S. Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (1988).
3 E.g., L. Jonathan Cohen, The Probable and the Provable (1977); D.H. Kaye,
Science in Evidence (1997); David H. Kaye, Introduction: What is Bayesianism?, in
Probability and Inference in the Law of Evidence: The Uses and Limits of
Bayesianism 1 (Peter Tillers & Eric D. Green eds., 1988); John Kaplan, Decision
Theory and the Factfinding Process, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065 (1968); Richard 0.
Lempert, Modeling Relevance, 75 Mich. L. Rev. 1021 (1977).
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croeconomics, 4 or simply the complete neglect of epistemological
matters. In our view, however, the naturalistic turn in epistemology
of the past thirty years-and, in particular, that branch of naturalized epistemology known as social epistemology-provides the
most appropriate theoretical framework for the study of evidence,
as it does for virtually any intellectual enterprise concerned with
the empirical adequacy of its theories and the truth-generating capacity of its methodologies. Evidence scholarship and law are
concerned with both, and thus naturalized epistemology provides a
fruitful way of understanding the limitations of some of the existing
efforts to provide theoretical and philosophical foundations to evidence law. It also provides a way to conceptualize and evaluate
specific rules of evidence. It has the additional virtue of explaining
what most evidence scholars do, regardless of their explicit philosophical commitments. For the great bulk of evidentiary scholars,
then, this paper merely solidifies the ground beneath their feet.
Part I will involve philosophical stage-setting, aimed at making
recent developments in philosophy intelligible to lawyers. Part I
will situate the naturalized epistemology approach briefly with respect to other "grand" attempts to provide conceptual foundations
to evidence law. Part Ill will employ the naturalized epistemology
approach to criticize existing theories of different evidentiary rules,
including Bayesianism, expected utility theory, and Judge Richard
A. Posner's recent economic analysis of the law of evidence. Part
III will conclude with a brief examination of another evidentiary
theory-the relative plausibility theory-that better meets the demands of the naturalistic approach than the other theories
considered. Part IV will show how this epistemological approach
applies to specific rules of evidence and will sketch directions for
further research.
I. NATURALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY

If the twentieth century began with the "linguistic turn" in philosophy--the idea that traditional philosophical problems were
4 E.g., Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 Stan.
L. Rev. 1477 (1999).
For an overview, see The Lingustic Turn: Recent Essays in Philosophical Method
(Richard Rorty ed., 1967).
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best analyzed and conceptualized as problems about language and
its relation to the world-its concluding quarter-century has been
marked by "the naturalistic turn." "Naturalism" has acquired multiple meanings in recent years,6 but the core commitment of
naturalists (at least for our purposes here) is methodological:Philosophy should be continuous with a posteriori inquiry in the
empirical sciences; philosophy cannot be an exclusively a priori
discipline.7 At one extreme, best exemplified by Professor W.V.O.
Quine, this means the replacement of philosophy by empirical science. In a less extreme and more influential form, best exemplified
by Professor Alvin I. Goldman, philosophical theorizing is constrained by empirical facts and often demands supplementation by
empirical information.9 Thus, in the case of individual epistemology-that branch of the theory of knowledge which focuses "on
mental operations of cognitive agents in isolation or abstraction
from other persons"---we cannot craft epistemic norms (norms
that would guide our acquisition of knowledge) without empirical
information about how the human cognitive apparatus actually
works. Since for Goldman a belief counts as knowledge if "caused
by a generally reliable process,"'" it follows that "[o]nly if (some of)
our basic cognitive processes are.., reliable.., can we qualify as
knowers. Therefore, whether we so qualify hinges, in part, on facts

6

For a review, with citations to much of the literature, and an attempt to sort out

the different meanings, see Brian Leiter, Naturalism and Naturalized Jurisprudence,
in Analyzing Law: New Essays in Legal Theory 79,80-92 (Brian Bix ed., 1998).
7Many naturalists also adopt a substantive view to the effect that the only things

that exist are those countenanced by the natural sciences. For discussion and citations,
see id. at 81-84. All substantive naturalists of this kind profess to be driven to the

view by methodological naturalism, though it is hard to see how appeal to the
empirical sciences would underwrite the most extreme forms of physicalism. See also
Jerry Fodor, Look!, London Rev. Books, Oct. 29, 1998, at 3 (reviewing Edward 0.

Wilson, Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge (1998)) (noting that the proliferation of
special sciences does not support the idea that all sciences will be reducible to

physics).
8E.g., W.V. Quine, Epistemology Naturalized, in Ontological Relativity and Other
Essays 69 (1969).
9

E.g., Alvin I. Goldman, Epistemology and Cognition (1986). For an indication of
the scope of the influence of Goldman's approach, see Philip Kitcher, The Naturalists
Return, 101 Phil. Rev. 53 (1992), and the discussion and citations therein.
10Goldman, supra note 1, at 4.
11Goldman, supra note 9, at 51. The details of Goldman's externalist reliabilism do
not matter here.
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in [empirical] psychology's bailiwick. 12 Notice that under Goldman's approach, the relevance of empirical psychology to
epistemology results from a proffered conceptual analysis of a conventional philosophical kind, that is, the suggestion that a belief is
knowledge if caused by a reliable process. It is that conceptual
analysis that makes empirical science relevant to assessing which
beliefs count as knowledge and to crafting epistemic norms to
regulate belief formation so that it yields knowledge.
But why naturalizeepistemology or any branch of philosophy, in
the sense of making it dependent upon empirical science? The motivations are various, and they sometimes depend on the part of
philosophy that one considers. One important impetus for naturalizing philosophy was Quine's seminal attack on the distinction
between "true in virtue of meaning" ("analytic" truths) versus
"true in virtue of empirical fact" ("synthetic" truths). 3 The former
were thought, at least by some logical positivists, to constitute the
distinctive domain of philosophical expertise, while the latter were
the property of empirical science. Philosophers would analyze and
clarify the meanings and concepts that define the framework in
which empirical science operates. But if there is no distinctive domain of truths of meaning, as Quine argues, then there is nothing
for philosophy to do: All the intellectual work falls to empirical science. 4 Few philosophers have followed Quine this far, though the
general moral-that philosophical claims are always vulnerable to
the successes of a posteriori inquiry-has been hard to deny. 5 A

Id. at 53.
'-'W.V. Quine, Carnap and Logical Truth, in The Ways of Paradox (1966), at 100;
W.V. Quine, Truth by Convention, in The Ways of Pardox, supra, at 70; William Van
Orman Quine, Two Dogmas of Empiricism, in From a Logical Point of View 20 (2d
ed., rev. 1980) [hereinafter Quine, Two Dogmas]. For an accessible discussion, see
Brian Leiter, Why Quine Is Not a Postmodernist, 50 SMU L. Rev. 1739, 1746-47
(1997). For more demanding treatments of Quine's work, see Christopher Hookway,
12

Quine: Language, Experience, and Reality (1988); George D. Romanos, Quine and

Analytic Philosophy (1983).

14 Of course, it is important for Quine's holism that there are no strictly "synthetic"
truths either, since every claim can be maintained in the face of recalcitrant evidence,
as long as we are willing to adjust other aspects of our worldview. See Quine, Two

Dogmas, supra note 13, at 42-44.
"This is not to say that it is universally heeded, as Professor Gilbert Harman
correctly complains in Doubts About Conceptual Analysis, in Philosophy in Mind 43
(Michaelis Michael & John O'Leary-Hawthorne eds., 1994).
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priori conceptual analysis can continue to play a role in philosophy,
but it offers no special insight into timeless truths and is always
vulnerable to radical revision or elimination in the light of empirical progress."
Some of the reasons for naturalism are more particular to epistemology. Professor Edmund L. Gettier's refutation of the thenprevailing analysis of the concept of knowledge as "justified true
belief" 7 was taken by many to show "that the epistemic status of a
belief state depends on the etiology of the state and, consequently,
on psychological facts about the subject."'" What Gettier's refutation meant, in other words, was that the actual causal trajectory
leading from evidentiary input to belief was crucial for establishing
whether the resultant belief would count as "knowledge."' 9 But the
actual causal trajectory leading to belief fell within the domain of
empirical science, not philosophy conceived as mere conceptual
analysis. Quine, by contrast, thought the failure of Cartesian foundationalism rendered the normative project of philosophical
epistemology futile and recommended its replacement with the
empirical study of the causal relationship between sensory inputs
and theoretical outputs.'
This is not, to be sure, the place for a sustained defense of the
naturalistic turn; we only want to locate our project within the existing philosophical landscape. Whether epistemology in general
should be naturalized is, in any case, irrelevant to the question of
whether naturalized epistemology provides a fruitful way of under16
This may understate the difficulties confronting conceptual analysis. For stronger
criticisms, see Brian Leiter, The Naturalistic Turn in Legal Philosophy, 00 APA
Newsl. on Law & Phil. 142 (2001).
11Edmund L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 Analysis 121 (1963).

IsKitcher, supra note 9, at 60.
'9 Goldman's alternative conceptual analysis of knowledge (and its component
elements like "justification") was responsive to this problem, by introducing as an
element of the concept the relevance of the actual trajectory leading to belief. See
Goldman, supra note 9, at 42-57. That in turn made empirical science relevant to the

project of epistemology. See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
20See Quine, supra note 8, at 83. There is some debate about the role of normative

epistemology in Quine's approach. Compare Jaegwon Kim, What is "Naturalized
Epistemology"?, in Supervenience and Mind (1993) (finding no such role), with
Richard Foley, Quine and Naturalized Epistemology, 19 Midwest Stud. Phil. 243

(1994) (finding such a role). For Quine's own views on the question (which support, in
part, Foley), see W.V. Quine, Pursuit of Truth 19-21 (1990).
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standing evidence law. The latter is our central contention and the
one this paper as a whole is meant to vindicate.
At the most general level, then, naturalizing epistemology means
viewing philosophical theorizing about knowledge as more than an
a priori armchair exercise, but rather as continuous with and dependent upon empirical science. Insofar as we follow Goldman in
retaining the distinctively normative element of epistemology-the
regulation of our cognitive activities so that they result in knowledge-then the rationale for naturalization is "that one cannot give
the best [normative] advice about intellectual operations without
detailed information about mental processes"" and how they really
work. But information about "mental processes" suffices only for
individual epistemology. As Goldman points out, "[t]he bulk of an
adult's world-view is deeply indebted to her social world. It can
largely be traced to social interactions, to influences exerted by
other knowers ....It is imperative, then, for epistemology to have
a social dimension. ' Social epistemology is simply that branch of
naturalized epistemology concerned not with individual knowers
but with the social processes and practices that inculcate beliefOn
While naturalized individual epistemology depends primarily on
the empirical sciences of the human cognitive apparatus, naturalized social epistemology must consider the range of empirical
sciences that examine the social mechanisms of belief-inculcation.
In what follows, we shall often speak of "naturalized epistemology" and "social epistemology" interchangeably.
It does bear noting, however, that there is another, rather different sense of "social epistemology" current in the literature, with
which our approach should not be confused. Some of those who
talk about "social" epistemology mean an approach which tries to
Goldman, Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition, 75 J. Phil.
(1978).
509, 509
21
Alvin1.
2
13

Alvin I. Goldman, Foundations of Social Epistemics, 73 Synthese 109,109 (1987).
More precisely, as Goldman says in his recent book, the "social" element of social

epistemology is threefold: (1) "[I]t focuses on social paths or routes to knowledge;"
(2) it "does not restrict itself to believers taken singly. It often focuses on some sort of
group entity-a team of co-workers, a set of voters in a political jurisdiction, or an
entire society-and examines the spread of information or misinformation across that
group's membership;" and (3) "instead of restricting knowers to individuals, social
epistemology may consider collective or corporate entities, such as juries or
legislatures, as potential knowing agents." Goldman, supra note 1, at 4-5.
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explain away what "passes" for knowledge in some community as
simply the product of social factors rather than epistemic considerations of any kind.24 We may call this approach debunking social
epistemology since it means to unmask the pretense of putative
knowledge claims by showing them to reflect social interests and
circumstances. Of course, debunking social epistemology might be
the upshot of a naturalized approach to epistemology:' It could
turn out, as an a posteriori matter, that the best explanation of the
claims we call "knowledge" only makes reference to non-epistemic
social factors. We need not rule out that possibility, and, as naturalists, we cannot rule it out a priori. But it remains an open empirical
question whether debunking social epistemology is accurate in its
portrayal of knowledge.
Social epistemology, in the sense we adopt, is normative or regulative in its ambitions. We want to ask, as Goldman puts it in his
recent important book on the subject, "Which [social] practices
have a comparatively favorable impact on knowledge as contrasted
with error and ignorance?"26 Social epistemology is, in this respect,
veritistic (to borrow Goldman's term): It is concerned with the production of knowledge, meaning (in part) true belief.' The
normative naturalized epistemologist embraces as his goal the
promulgation of norms by which to regulate our epistemic practices so that they yield knowledge. In the case of individual
epistemology, this means the norms governing how individuals
should acquire and weigh evidence as well as, ultimately, form beliefs. In the case of social epistemology, it means the norms
governing the social mechanisms and practices that inculcate belief.
The rules of evidence are a prime case of the latter, for these
rules structure the epistemic process by which jurors arrive at beliefs about disputed matters of fact at trials. As such, the rules of
evidence are a natural candidate for investigation by social epistemologists. We may ask of any particular rule: Does it increase the
likelihood that jurors will reach true beliefs about disputed matters
of fact? Of course, it does not make sense to ask that of every rule
24

E.g., Steve Fuller, Social Epistemology (1988).
the discussion of "radical naturalism" in Kitcher, supra note 9, at 96.
26
Goldman, supra note 1, at 5.
21 Id. See generally id. at 79-100 for some of the details and complications involved
in assessing practices along veritistic dimensions.
2See
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since some rules of evidence-for example, Federal Rules of Evidence 407-11-are not meant to facilitate the discovery of truth
but to carry out various policy objectives such as reducing accidents and avoiding litigation. We return to this issue in Part II
below.
Social epistemology, as a branch of naturalized epistemology,
must honor two particularly important constraints. First, as Goldman remarks, "advice in matters intellectual, as in other matters,
should take account of the agent's capacities.... As in the ethical
sphere, 'ought' implies 'can'."' In other words, normative epistemology, like normative ethics, cannot require of agents actions
(mental or physical) that they cannot perform. Second, naturalized
epistemology "assumes that cognitive operations should be assessed instrumentally: given a choice of cognitive procedures, those
which would produce the best set of consequences should be se' In other words, normative epistemology must always ask
lected."29
about the actual consequences of alternative sets of epistemic
norms, that is, which are the most effective means for producing
knowledge. Given these constraints, naturalized epistemology must
then be continuous with empirical science in two quite particular
senses: (1) We need to know what epistemic norms in fact lead to
the acquisition of knowledge; and (2) we need to identify epistemic
norms that are actually usable by creatures like us. This rules out
epistemic norms which require of cognizers belief-formation practices
(individual or social) beyond their ken.' Naturalized epistemology, in
short, emphasizes the instrumentalcharacter of normative theorizing in epistemology, but the only way to assess instrumental claims
is to do so empirically, that is, by finding out what means really
bring about what ends.
I. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE CONCEPTUAL
FOUNDATIONS OF EVIDENCE

Professor James B. Thayer, in his famous treatise, wrote, "[w]hen
men speak of historical evidence and scientific evidence, and the
21Goldman, supra note 21, at 510.
" Id. at 520. For a similar approach, see Larry Laudan, Normative Naturalism, 57
Phil. Sci. 44,46 (1990).
10See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 21, at 512-13.
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evidences of Christianity, they are talking about a different sort of
thing. The law of evidence has to do with the furnishing to a court
of matter of fact, for use in a judicial investigation."'" Social epistemology, as a naturalistic approach to the law of evidence, is
premised on a rejection of Thayer's position, at least as it is understood as a claim about differences in kind. In fact, social
epistemology might properly consider history, science, and religion
from the veritistic standpoint, trying to ascertain the extent to
which the constitutive practices of each arena reliably produce
knowledge. For the social epistemologist, then, the law of evidence
is not a "different sort of thing" from any other practice that has as
one of its elements the production of knowledge.
In another sense, though, the law of evidence is different. It operates within a distinctive social institution (the trial and the
adversarial system more generally), rather than within the laboratory or the library. It employs a distinctive division of epistemic
labor, with one set of actors (judges) first determining the evidential base upon which another set of actors (jurors) will rely in
forming beliefs about disputed matters of fact. 2 Finally, considered
as a whole, the law of evidence does not have as its only aim the
production of true belief. It is true that Federal Rule 102 defines
the "purpose" of the rules as "that the truth may be ascertained,"33
but some of the rules themselves have no veritistic dimension,'
while others mix veritistic and non-veritistic concerns. 5

3IJames

Bradley Thayer, A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law

264 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
SThe division is actually more complex than this since judges make their

determination within an evidential base created not by them but by the advocates for
each party to a dispute. In theory, at least, the adversarial system should produce a
very large evidential base, one that might even match or exceed in scope the

evidential base that the scientist or historian might consider for his distinctive
purposes.
33
Fed. R. Evid. 102.
E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 407-11 (excluding evidence to achieve various non-truth-

seeking policy objectives). The common-law privileges also match this description.
3-E.g., Fed. R. Evid. 413-15 (concerning sex offense cases). These recent
lamentable amendments to the Federal Rules-which admit the sexual background of
sexual predators apparently regardless of its relevancy or prejudicial effect-are
unique in authorizing admission of evidence on "policy" grounds. The cases, however,

seem to be concluding that Federal Rules 413-15 do not dispense with Federal Rule
403. E.g., United States v. Meacham, 115 F.3d 1488,1495 (10th Cir. 1997).
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Still, considered as a whole, it is striking and important that the
vast majority of the rules of evidence have as their primary rationale
their (alleged) truth-conducive virtues. Competency of witnesses,
authentication of evidence, relevancy, expert testimony, and hearsay (including the exceptions) all rest on the thought that inclusion
and exclusion of evidence in line with these rules will increase the
frequency with which truth is ascertained.36 Social epistemology, as
a framework for thinking about evidence, is committed to an investigation of the extent to which the conceptual foundations of
evidence law rest upon the aim of true belief and the extent to
which evidence law succeeds in that aim.
This approach permits conceptual neutrality over some of the
debates about evidence law familiar from the secondary literature.
Thus, for example, we have no reason to take sides between those
who advocate the "jury control principle" (the idea "that the organizing principle of Evidence law [is] a fear that lay jurors [will]
misuse certain types of evidence"' ) and those who advocate the
"best evidence principle" (the idea that "[t]he best evidence must
be given of which the nature of the case permits"'). Both are quite
obviously predicated on an interest in promoting true belief, and
thus both are compatible with the social epistemology framework.
Thus, the worry that "jurors [will] misuse certain types of evidence" is precisely the worry that they will misuse them by drawing
inferences that lead to false beliefs. So too, the underlying impetus
for the best evidence principle is precisely the idea that "the rules
of evidence with respect to trial in a court of law are, and should
be, focused primarily on ascertaining the truth about controverted
issues of fact within appropriate resource constraints."39 Of course,
the empirical adequacy of either account deserves investigation,

-1Hearsay is also in part driven by policy considerations, in particular in the criminal
arena where there is a deeply-held belief in the importance of confrontation.
11Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Worst Evidence Principle: The Best Hypothesis as
to the Logical Structure of Evidence Law, 46 U. Miami L. Rev. 1069,1070 (1992).
'1 John

Huxley Buzzard et al., Phipson on Evidence § 126, at 55 (12th ed. 1976)

(emphasis omitted), quoted in Dale A. Nance, The Best Evidence Principle, 73 Iowa

L. Rev. 227, 234 & n.33 (1988). Nance's formulation is that "a party should present to
the tribunal the best evidence reasonably available on a litigated factual issue."
Nance, supra, at 227.
-1Nance, supra note 38, at 294.
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with respect to both the accuracy of the description of the litigation
process and the veritistic consequences of different approaches.
The jury control principle does, however, highlight an interesting
feature of our evidentiary rules, namely, their epistemic paternalism:
Paternalism in any domain of legal regulation supposes that
rules should substitute the rulemaker's judgment about what is
best for agents for the agents' own judgments. Epistemic paternalism substitutes the rulemaker's judgment about what is
epistemically best for agents for their own judgment. Assuming
that the primary epistemic value is truth, epistemic paternalism
entails designing rules of evidence that are epistemically best
for jurors, i.e., that lead them to form true beliefs about disputed matters of fact. Doing so requires, of course, taking into
account both the epistemic frailties of jurors, and the epistemic
limits of the rule-appliers [the "gatekeepers"], namely judges.'
Indeed, it is useful in analyzing the law of evidence to distinguish
primary from secondary epistemic rules:
Primary epistemic rules take into account the epistemic shortcomings of jurors, such as their susceptibility to confusion and
prejudice or their generally modest level of intellectual ability.
Secondary epistemic rules take into account the epistemic
shortcomings of judges, such as their general lack of expertise
in scientific matters. The rule of evidence that excludes unscientific evidence is a primary epistemic rule in the sense that it is
predicated on the assumption that jurors must be "protected"
from junk science in forming beliefs about disputed matters of
fact. The rule of evidence requiring judges to exclude unscientific evidence is a secondary epistemic rule in the sense that it
requires judges to make an epistemic judgment about whether
some piece of evidence is scientific or not.
We can evaluate either a primary or secondary epistemic rule
along veritistic dimensions. With respect to the former, we ask
whether evidence excluded and included in accordance with the
rule will reliably lead jurors to form true beliefs about disputed
40Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. Rev. 803,
814-15.
41

Id. at 815.
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matters of fact. With respect to the latter, we ask whether the rule
is such that judges can reliably apply it. Of course, a primary epistemic rule that fails along its veritistic dimension precludes any
need to inquire about how it fares qua secondary epistemic rule.
III. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE EMPIRICAL
ADEQUACY OF EXISTING THEORIES OF THE EVIDENTIARY PROCESS

Existing attempts to make theoretical sense of the evidentiary
process have inadequately attended to their empirical adequacy
and, in addition, have fairly systematically run afoul of the two
constraints of naturalized epistemology: "ought implies can" and
the instrumental character of normative advice. Formal models of
legal decisionmaking often ask actors to do what they cannot do
and (unsurprisingly) fail to inquire as to whether the formalized
models at issue will in fact increase the veritistic reliability of the
process. We shall critique three models of the evidentiary process,
two of which fall prey to these problems and for which there is a
substantial literature: expected utility theory as an explanation of
burdens of persuasion, and Bayes' theorem as a theory of inference
and relevance. The third model we consider is the economic analysis of evidence law represented by Posner's recent foray into the
field. The economic model is less directly concerned with veritism
than its competitors; our main interest in it is that it exemplifies the
limits of formal, a priori reasoning about the evidentiary process.
We conclude with a discussion of a fourth model of the evidentiary
process, the relative plausibility theory, that we think better captures the relevant empirical phenomena and does not demand of
decisionmakers that they engage in tasks beyond their ken.
A. Expected Utility Theory
Burdens of persuasion appear to lend themselves quite readily to
decision-theoretic explanations. Actual truth is rarely known in any
particular case.'2 It certainly violates no canon of common sense to
view these circumstances as calling for maximizing expected utility.
Moreover, simple calculation generates the expected utility maxi,2Otherwise, there would be little need for a trial. The large number of cases
needing decision indicates that actual truth is rarely known.
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mizing rules. In a case involving a binary choice where the disutilities of wrongful verdicts are equal, the decision should be for
whomever the probabilities favor. This is the 0.5 rule of civil litigation. In cases involving more than two possible explanations, the
decision should be for the most probable (and here we see the first
problem, for this is not the law). If disutilities of wrongful decisions
are not equal, as in criminal cases where a wrongful conviction is
considerably worse than a wrongful acquittal, the decision rule is
adjusted to accommodate the difference. At least, this is what the
expected utility theorists argue."
Naturalized epistemology should alert us to the fact, however,
that the relationship between the world of mathematics and the
world of human affairs may not be simple. Here there are two substantial difficulties. First, in its present version, expected utility
theory does not in fact describe the law although it may be used to
criticize it. The law applies burdens of persuasion to elements, not
to causes of action as a whole. Expected utility theory conflates the
two as though the question asked at trial were liability or no liability. In a sense, that is in fact the question but only after burdens of
persuasion are applied to individual elements. Applying burdens of
persuasion understood as probability measures to elements yields
the well-known paradoxes of proof. If, for example, two stochastically independent issues are each established to a 0.6 probability,
the probability of them both being true is 0.36.' Returning a verdict for a plaintiff in such cases is not going to maximize expected
utility.
The puzzles press more deeply, however. The expected utility
theorist may respond by criticizing the law and arguing that it is the
conjunction of elements that should be found to a specific level.
This, too, yields unacceptable consequences, by making the level of
proof of specific elements turn on the fortuity of the number of
elements in a cause of action. Take the example of theft and mur3

See, e.g., Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1071-73. For more detailed treatment of
expected utility theory, see David Kaye, The Limits of the Preponderance of the
Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causation,
1982 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 487; David Kaye, Naked Statistical Evidence, 89 Yale L.J.
601 (1980) (book review).
4

" For a discussion of this and other paradoxes, see Ronald J. Allen, A
Reconceptualization of Civil Trials, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 401 (1986).
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der. Theft has considerably more elements than murder. To convict
for theft requires on average that intent to steal be established to a
higher probability than intent to kill for a murder conviction. This
strikes all legal observers as both unacceptable and absurd. 5 There
is a still deeper formal problem here. Finding the probability of the
conjunction of discrete elements may require massive amounts of
information, and in any event cannot be done in the simple and direct manner of providing proof of the discrete elements. One of the
logical implications of probability theory is, briefly, that virtually
any relationship may exist between discrete elements and their
combinations. For example, as the probability of two discrete elements each goes up, the probability of their conjunction may go
down.4 As Professor Ron A. Shapira has summed up the situation,
"one of the crucial things which require knowledge in all theories
of evidence is a prior partition of the universe of discourse into
equivalence classes, as, alternatively, a prior determination of essential properties of objects or relevant experimental variables."'47
The point is that the path between even such a simple formalization as probability statements about discrete elements and the
objectives of trials is quite unclear. The specter of running afoul of
"ought implies can" now arises.
There is a second set of problems with expected utility theory: In
its simplest manifestation, it ignores base rates, systematic errors in
probability assessments, and the fact that it is not the subjective
expectation of judges and jurors that the legal system wishes to
maximize. More sophisticated versions of expected utility theory,
by contrast, have not given a plausible account of how these matters could be taken into account in a way that would increase the
probability of furthering the objectives of the legal system. All versions also neglect certain implications of subjective probabilities
that will be discussed in the next subsection.

4

1 E.g.,

id. at 407.

46This is

an example of Simpson's paradox, which has only recently been introduced

into the evidentiary literature. See Ronald J. Allen, Factual Ambiguity and a Theory
of Evidence, 88 Nw. U. L. Rev. 604, 604, 608 (1994). For a thorough development of

its implications, see Ron A. Shapira, The Susceptibility of Formal Models of
Evidentiary Inference to Cultural Sensitivity, 5 Cardozo J. Int'l & Comp. L. 165, 16977 (1997).
41Shapira, supra note 46, at 187.
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The legal system involves third-party decisionmakers-judges
and juries-implementing the wishes and commands of the sovereign people-or less grandly of the policymakers-who are
typically legislators and sometimes constitution writers. The utility
to be maximized is that of the policymakers, not that of the judges
and juries, and the two could be widely disparate. For example,
with no knowledge of base rates or the relative accuracy of probability assessments, the lessons of expected utility theory are quite
straightforward for factfinders. If the policymaker thinks he is in
possession of such knowledge, that knowledge may dramatically
affect the expected outcome from the policymaker's point of view.
Take a simple example. If no factually liable defendants go to trial,
the only kind of error possible is holding a defendant wrongfully
liable (a false positive). Increasing the burden of persuasion can
only increase the policymaker's expected utility, whatever it does
to that of the factfinder. Analogously, policymakers may believe
that probability assessments of factfinders are skewed in some
fashion, generating the same problem.
No means of accommodating this point has been advanced. The
proponents of expected utility theory have simply asserted that beliefs about base rates and the probability assessments can
themselves be taken into account when forming subjective probabilities. This is true enough, but it is difficult to see what
programmatic implications it may have, for informing the factfinder of this knowledge would have unpredictable effects on the
factfinder's appraisal of the evidence. Any particular factfinder
may overestimate or underestimate the probabilities of liability,
and information about the systemic knowledge may lead to widely
disparate adjustments to accommodate that knowledge. In any
event, the current state of the law in the United States disconfirms
a close connection between expected utility theory and actual trial
process.'

41 A full treatment of the relevant issues would have to include the vast area of
presumptions, inferences, and explicit modifications of the burdens of proof prevalent
in American trial process.
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B. Bayes' Theorem
Just as burdens of proof seem to lend themselves to decision
theoretic analyses, so does the evidentiary process at trial seem to
lend itself to a Bayesian interpretation. Indeed, it is quite natural to
think of the evidentiary process as the updating of a prior probability in light of new evidence, as Bayes' Theorem prescribes. There
are a number of difficulties with such an analysis from the standpoint of social epistemology, however.
The first worry is computational complexity, which raises the
specter of violating "ought implies can." A huge and complicated
data set is involved at most trials, even most "simple" trials. No
computer, let alone any human, has the computational capacity to
do the calculations necessary for the operation of Bayes' Theorem
in a reasonable amount of time. Bayesians respond, appropriately,
that it is not their fault that the world is complicated. The issue,
however, is not fault, but reality: The world is complicated, and
that fact constrains normative advice. The Bayesians might still retort that nothing within Bayes' Theorem instructs on what the unit
of analysis should be. Thus, the factfinder can lump a bunch of
stuff together and update his prior probability using the bunch of
stuff as the datum of "new evidence.""9 This move carries only a
false promise. The real intellectual work will have been done in the
"bunching," and the failure to "bunch" correctly will lead inexorably to false outcomes (except only by chance).'
A second worry arises when we reflect upon the description of
trials. Factfinders typically have no good sense of what is going on
until the end of the trial at closing arguments. Moreover, they are
not bound in any way by those arguments and are free to generate
their own theories of what happened. This has two implications.
First, once the factfinder hears the various theories in closing argument, to operate Bayes' Theorem it must then assign
probabilities to the various theories. Those probabilities will be assigned in light of the evidence heard at trial, and thus all that
evidence is what is called "old evidence," which simply means it

41

For a discussion, see Ronald J.Allen, Rationality, Algorithms and Juridical Proof:

A Preliminary Inquiry, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 254 (1997).

" See Ronald J. Allen, Clarifying The Burden Of Persuasion and Bayesian Decision
Rules: A Response To Professor Kaye, 4 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 246 (2000).
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has already been taken into account. Second, even following the
assignment of initial probabilities, new theories can emerge during
deliberations. The emergence of a new theory requires, for Bayes'
Theorem, a reassignment of initial probabilities of all possible
theories, and again the problem of old evidence rears up. The possible scope of Bayesian computations is thus exceedingly limited."
Another difficulty with Bayesian approaches to juridical evidence is that the assignments of initial probabilities, which are
crucial to the application of the Theorem, are subjective and need
respect only the conditions of consistency and summing to 1.0.
That means that individuals can begin from radically different perspectives, and each, in Bayesian terms, will be operating equally
rationally. Bayes' Theorem provides no method of adjudicating
such differences, which means it does not offer useful guidance for
factfinders. In other contexts, such as science, these differences
may be marginalized by convergence theorems that demonstrate
that over time and with enough new evidence the divergent initial
starting points will wash out and the result will converge on the
truth. There is nothing even remotely analogous to this in the condition of trials. Jurors are more like scientists reflecting on new
theories for the first time than like scientists who have generated
substantial evidence over time designed to adjudicate between
competing scientific theories. Without something to take the place
of convergence theorems, the arguments about Bayes' Theorem in
the law are left with no obvious bridge between the subjective and
the objective.'
To be sure, all theories of juridical evidence will have a subjective component, but the irony of the Bayesian approach is that it
implicitly exploits the false hope that by running one's subjective
beliefs through Bayes' Theorem with the assistance of equally subjective likelihood ratios, something other than a subjective output
will result. This is false. The risk is that the allure of the false hope
will distract decisionmakers from what tools for reaching objectiv, Allen,

supra note 49, at 267-68. The point in the text holds at least as far as

discovery is concerned. Justification may be a different matter, but the task at trial is
more analogous to discovery than justification. For an analogous discussion of the
role of Bayes' Theorem in the sciences, see Mark Lange, Calibration and the

Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization, 96 J. Phil. 294 (1999).
12Allen, supra note 49, at 267.
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ity they actually have available to them-tools that can be summarized in the notion of painstaking attention to and examination of
the evidence and its logical and empirical implications. Moreover,
the radical subjectivity of juridical Bayesianism is not a necessary
component of theories of juridical proof. For example, the relative
plausibility theory discussed in Section III.D below emphasizes the
substantive component of factfinding and does not exploit the
Bayesian mirage that algorithms may be substituted for substantive
engagement with the evidence.
There are further intractable problems with the Bayesian approach. For example, Professor Leonard J. Savage's formalization
of subjective probability includes the "sure thing" principle, which
is the pivotal axiom that produces the interchangeability of subjective and objective probabilities." This axiom says that if act A is
preferred to act B under one set of assumptions about nature, then
augmenting the set of assumptions should not cause a reversal of
preferences, that is, for B to be preferred over A. For example, if
you are given a menu and you prefer chicken to turkey and then
are told that the kitchen also serves duck, it is a violation of the
sure thing principle to say, "Given that additional information, I
will switch my order to turkey."'
Unfortunately for Bayesian approaches, humans disobey this
axiom all the time. Suppose you believe that turkey requires great
care in preparation, and you ordered chicken because you are risk
averse. Duck is very difficult to prepare, however. Having learned
that duck is on the menu, you have greater trust in the chef and so
switch from chicken to turkey. This violates the sure thing principle. People regularly disobey this axiom because it requires the
articulation of all logical propositions in a probability space-a
daunting task even in a quite confined space, and an impossible
one when the probability space ranges over all human affairs.
(Remember: "Ought implies can"!) This is a particularly acute
problem for group decisionmaking. As Savage himself wrote, "It
would not be strange, for example, if a banquet committee about to

- Leonard J. Savage, The Foundations of Statistics 21-26 (2d ed. rev. 1972).
The language in the text is largely that of Professor Albert Madansky of the
University of Chicago, for whose help with some of the more difficult aspects of

subjective probability we are indebted.
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agree to buy chicken should, on being informed that goose is also
available, finally compromise on duck."5
Naturalized epistemology, then, recommends considerable skepticism about Bayesianism for thinking seriously about evidence.
Bayesianism is formally elegant, but of little practical use for explicating juridical matters, although it does have some value as an
informal heuristic.'
C. The Economic Analysis of Evidence
Another form of a priori reasoning that from time to time can
run afoul of the admonitions of naturalized epistemology is microeconomic analysis of law, a point implicit in Shapira's argument
"that conventional formulae of law and economics are so far removed from the practice of factfinding as to render their
application to the law of evidence highly problematic, even as a
normative tool."'57 Nonetheless, Posner has recently published a
wide-ranging economic analysis of the law of evidence and other
55
Savage, supra note 53, at 207. There are certain complexities here. Empirical work
has demonstrated that individuals violate the sure thing principle. See Eldar Shafir,
Uncertainty and the Difficulty of Thinking Through Disjunctions, 50 Cognition 403
(1994); Amos Tversky & Eldar Shafir, The Disjunction Effect in Choice Under
Uncertainty, 3 Psychol. Sci. 305 (1992). Whether the textual example is a real-life
example is more difficult to evaluate, for it might instead be an example of a
misspecification of the probability space (by failing to take account of a known
probability, for example). The upshot, however, is essentially the same whatever the
example exemplifies. If the example is a violation of the sure thing principle, then
subjective probability axioms are violated. If it is an example of a misspecified
probability space, it demonstrates how at trial the probability space is constantly
corrigible based on new information until the point of decision. That in turn means
that there is no work for Bayes' Theorem to do until the point of decision, at which
point the probability space is formed; but there is no work for Bayes' Theorem to do
at that point either, for all evidence will be old evidence.
Another difficulty for subjective probability approaches is that preferences may not
be stable over time. Alternatively, individuals may misassess their preferences. See,
e.g., Daniel T. Gilbert et al., Immune Neglect: A Source of Durability Bias in
Affective Forecasting, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 617 (1998). The latter point is
at the heart of the debate over euthanasia, for example, with many believing that
preferences stated in advance of any particular event may not reflect an individual's
views once imminently faced with that event.
"See, e.g., Richard Lempert, Of Flutes, Oboes and the As If World of Evidence
Law, 1 Int'l J. Evidence & Proof 316 (1997).
17Ron A. Shapira, Economic Analysis of the Law of Evidence: A Caveat, 19
Cardozo L. Rev. 1607,1607 (1998).
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litigation-related matters.' Although Posner's effort is "eclectic
rather than narrowly economic... it slights epistemological and
other philosophical perspectives on the trial process, which seem to
[him] to have only a very limited utility."59 We think the good judge
doth protest too much; indeed, he has it exactly backwards. The
value of his article is in an inverse relationship to its reliance on a
priori microeconomic reasoning. When engaging in his "eclectic
analysis" from the stance of the empiricist more interested in the
relationship between predictions of formal models and reality than
just the predictions themselves, Posner provides some interesting
discussions largely confirmatory of pre-existing scholarship in the
field of evidence.' When, by contrast, Posner shifts to the mode of
the law and economics a priori analyst, little of value relevant to
the actual operation or understanding of the legal system results.
Rather, his analysis highlights the limits of this form of a priori reasoning.
The objective of this Section is to demonstrate that the utility of
Posner's analysis is directly proportional to the extent he works
within the empirical tradition and inversely proportional to his reliance on a priori reasoning divorced from the relevant factual
setting. We do not intend here to provide a general critique of economics, economic reasoning, or law and economics.6' Rather, we
are critiquing the forms and applications of economic reasoning
employed by Posner in this one context.
Even pursuing such limited objectives has certain difficulties,
however. Foremost is that Posner's analysis is not limited to what is
- Posner, supra note 4.
'Id. at 1479.
For example, his discussion of the positive social value of litigation is a helpful
antidote to the argument that litigation is simply an argument over spilled milk. See
Posner, supra note 4. For previous discussions, see Ronald J.Allen et al., A Positive
Theory of the Attorney-Client Privilege and the Work Product Doctrine, 19 J.Legal
Stud. 359, 388-96 (1990); Craig R. Callen, Adjudication and the Appearance of
Statistical Evidence, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 457,479 (1991).
" For such critiques, see Alexander Rosenberg, Economics-Mathematical Politics
or Science of Diminishing Returns? (1992); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach
to Law and Economics, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1471 (1998); Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics,
and Classical Realism, in The Path of the Law and Its Influence: The Legacy of Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. 285, 301-10 (Steven J.Burton ed., 2000). For Posner's response
to the Jolls critique, see Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics,
and the Law, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1551 (1998).
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conventionally thought of as the law of evidence but includes the
rules of discovery and basic structural issues such as the differences
between inquisitorial and adversarial proceedings. We ignore most
of this for two reasons. First, the portrayal of the "inquisitorial"
system bears little relationship to any existing system of which we
are aware-apparently deliberately so. Posner remarks that "I wish
to make the contrast between the systems as stark as possible, and
so I shall treat tendencies as if they were their extremes."' Perhaps
he has succeeded in doing so, but to what avail is unclear. The
question, one would think, is the actual operation of actual systems, not the hypothesized tendencies of hypothetical systems.
Perhaps Posner's analysis might lead an investigator to hypotheses
for investigation, but all it leads to here is the reiteration of wellknown questions about the relative virtues of differing forms of adjudication.63 Second, Posner's analysis undervalues the extent to
6 Posner, supra note 4, at 1487-88.
0 It does lead him to some unconventional conclusions. For example, Posner
comments that "[it is commonly remarked, as though the point were obvious, that
the inquisitorial approach is more efficient than the adversarial approach. This article
challenges that assumption." Id. at 1488 n.20 (citation omitted). We agree with the
assessment of the implications of the comparison of American and some foreign
systems, but Posner's argument has no more power to persuade than the American
comparativists who assert to the contrary and for the same reason: Neither is
exploring the actual operation of any system as it really is; both are merely expressing
logical conclusions given their assumptions. The neglect of even the most basic form
of empiricism-accurate description of relevant phenomena-in comparative legal
scholarship is astonishing; there is typically a yawning chasm separating what
comparativists writing in English say about systems and what is actually true of them.
E.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., The German Advantage in Civil Procedure: A Plea for
More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative Scholarship, 82 Nw. U. L. Rev.
705 (1988). Recently a German judge has written of the German criminal process and
entitled section I of his article "The Crisis in German Criminal Procedure." He
comments:
For years academic writers on German criminal law as well as the country's
appellate courts have explored the possibilities of reacting to obstruction of the
trial by defence counsel. The criminal justice system is said to be in overload. It
is thought that a great part of this is due to dilatory and obstructive tactics of
defence counsel or of the defendants themselves. Some even complain that it
has become impossible to conclude a criminal trial within an adequate period of
time and to reach a verdict. At least one court.., has reacted with an act of
desperation, dismissing an appeal because defence counsel had threatened to
boycott [sic] the proceedings with a veritable flood of motions for new
evidence. This is a result of the German inquisitorial principle, where it is not
for the prosecution or the defence actually to adduce their evidence. Rather,
they are required to identify it and then request the court to summon and hear
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which discovery mechanisms, the structure of trial, and evidentiary
rules can be independent. He thus neglects the similarities in the
rules of evidence of these supposedly contrasting systems-the effects of which on adjudication, given differing formal structures,
must be explained. Germany has robust privileges, for example;'
experts have to be qualified as experts everywhere;' much of
Europe employs a version of the hearsay rule in various contexts;'
new witnesses, procure documents, and so on. Such motions have no time
limits. They may be made up to the very moment when the judge begins
reading the sentence.
Michael Bohlander, A Silly Question? Court Sanctions Against Defence Counsel for
Trial Misconduct, 10 Crim. L.F. 467, 468-69 (1999) (footnotes omitted). Judge
Bohlander's brief description is good evidence both of the limitations of conventional
American comparative scholarship and Posner's alternative approach. The defender
of the standard law and economics approach may think we are being ungenerous in
neglecting the support given to empirical conclusions consistent with° our own by
analyses such as Posner's, but, risking even more the appearance of lack of generosity,
we do not see such analyses as providing any support. Posner is not only talking of
"tendencies" rather than the real thing; he also is talking of "tendencies" of fictional
entities.
14John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev.
823, 829 (1985).
-SSee, e.g., id. at 835-41; Allen, supra note 63, at 735-45.
Article 6 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms provides in part: "(3) Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:... (d) to examine or have examined witnesses against him
and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the
same conditions as witnesses against him .... " European Convention on Human
Rights, Jan. 1971, art. 6.
In a series of cases, the European Court of Human Rights has found that the failure
to allow confrontation of witnesses-that is, what we would call the admissibility of
hearsay--can violate the Convention. Consider this excerpt from the Kostovski case:
In principle, all the evidence must be produced in the presence of the accused
at a public hearing with a view to adversarial argument. This does not mean,
however, that in order to be used as evidence statements of witnesses should
always be made at a public hearing in court: to use as evidence such statements
obtained at the pre-trial stage is not in itself inconsistent with paragraphs 3 (d)
and 1 of Article 6, provided the rights of the defence have been respected.
As a rule, these rights require that an accused should be given an adequate
and proper opportunity to challenge and question a witness against him, either
at the time the witness was making his statement or at some later stage of the
proceedings.
Kostovski Case, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 20 (1989) (citations omitted). But see
Doorson v. Netherlands, App. No. 20524/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330 (1996) (holding
that examination of witnesses in the presence of defense counsel was sufficient). The
standard assertion that the hearsay rule is not employed in inquisitorial systems is
obviously false. Sometimes it is applied quite analogously to its use in the United
States. In fact, the analogy is even more complete than it appears. Although in many
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the European Court of Justice has found a right to silence and to
be free from compelled self-incrimination implicit in the European
Convention on Human Rights;67 and so on.'
In addition to emphasizing again that we do not make here any
general claims about economics or its utility in any other context,
we wish further to clarify the scope of our discussion in one particular. We are assuming that Posner's "economic appraisal" of the
law of evidence is directed at explanation. The issue, in other
words, is not economics as a theoretical construct that has certain
interesting implications if applied in a certain way to specific concepts taken from the field of evidence. Instead, the question is the
actual utility of economics as employed by Posner to explain what
is observed in the field of evidence.
To begin, there is much to praise in Posner's effort. It is the first
attempt at-a comprehensive economic analysis of evidence and will
undoubtedly spur considerable work in the field. Moreover, many
of his points are persuasive; indeed many of his points, as he notes,
are already well-accepted in the field. We thus doubt that Posner
is correct that his "conclusion will startle."' His conclusion is
jurisdictions there is formally no exclusion of hearsay, nonetheless hearsay is viewed
skeptically as undeserving of substantial weight as evidence. There are also rules of
corroboration to the effect that unsubstantiated hearsay may be insufficient to justify
verdicts. For a recent example from the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, see Prosecutor v. Zlatko Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-AR73
(Appeals Chamber, ICIY, Feb. 16,1999), at http:llwww.un.orgicty/aleksovskilappeall
decision-e/90216EV36313.htm. To "compare" the hearsay rule in the United States to its
functional counterparts in the European Community, or anywhere else, one must take
such nuances into account.
67 Saunders v. United Kingdom, App. No. 19187/91, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 313 (1996).
6See,
e.g., Richard S. Frase, The Search For the Whole Truth About American and
European Criminal Justice, 3 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 785, 787 (2000) (reviewing William
T. Pizzi, Trials Without Truth (1999)) ("One of [Professor Pizzi's] most important
contributions is to spread the word about the growing similarity of criminal justice
systems in western countries-all of them are at least partially 'adversary'-and most of
them have rules excluding at least some illegally-seized evidence.") (citations omitted).
6Posner,
supra note 4, at 1485 ("The economic approach serves more to refine and
extend than to challenge the intuitions of the legal professional.") Often, however,
Posner's analysis simply repeats well-known positions without any discernable
refinement or extension, or citation to or discussion of the relevant literature for that
matter, which obscures precisely what refinements and extensions there may be. His
treatment of burdens of proof is an example. His conclusion that burdens of
production may further efficiency has been known since Professor John T.
McNaughton's famous article, "Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of a
Burden of Persuasion," 68 Harv. L. Rev. 1382 (1955), and is part of standard
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that the institutional and doctrinal structure of the American
law of evidence has a subtle, though intuitive, implicit, and incomplete economic logic ....Most evidence professors, and
even a few judges, would, if asked, say that of course the
American system of finding facts at trial is inefficient, ludicrously so, and redeemed
if at all by the noneconomic values
71
that the system protects.

The support for this empirical proposition is a cite to Judge
Marvin Frankel's well-known lament about the adversarial system
in a lecture given prior to the effective date of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.' Judge Frankel was not addressing the law of evidence
at all, and certainly not the nonexistent Federal Rules of Evidence. 3 Perhaps if the set of all comparativists, proceduralists (civil
and criminal), and evidence professors was asked about Posner's
conclusion, it would startle the bulk of them. By contrast, we predict that most law professors specializing in evidence would if
asked say that of course the law of evidence (understood primarily
as the Federal Rules of Evidence and its common-law predecessor-the entire system of litigation is another matter) has at least "a
subtle, though intuitive, implicit, and incomplete economic logic. " '
discussions in evidence casebooks. See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen et al., Evidence: Text,
Cases, and Problems 820-25 (2d ed. 1997). Posner's analysis of the McDonnell
Douglas rule, that it "is justifiable in neutral terms of minimizing cost, specifically
minimizing the cost of trial in cases in which the parties can be induced to 'show their
hand' before trial," Posner, supra note 4, at 1504, appears to map directly onto the
standard descriptions given of the rule in the casebooks. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra,
at 870-72. There are numerous instances like this in which it would have been helpful
to have the refinements and extensions pointed out more explicitly so that they could
be evaluated.
70Posner, supra note 4, at 1478.
71Id.

(footnote omitted).

Id. at 1478 n.3 (citing Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal
View, 123 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1031 (1975)). The paper was based on Judge Frankel's
lecture given December 16, 1974. Frankel, supra, at 1031 n.*. The Federal Rules came
into effect in 1975.
71Frankel,
supra note 72 (questioning instead whether the adversarial system placed
a high enough value on the search for truth).
74This is, to be sure, a factual issue that, to our knowledge, has not been the subject
of robust empirical inquiry, and thus we remain open to the possibility of its being in
error. But based on our experience of teaching and writing in the area over a twentyfive year period, the economics of trial generally and of presenting evidence
specifically are standard fare in standard evidence courses, even if commonly spoken
of in conventional rather than microeconomic terminology. We are unaware of any
support for Posner's assertions about what evidence professors would assert.
7
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Many (actually, close to all, we predict) would say that the "economic logic" of some of the rules is pretty explicit-at least in the
sense that they are concerned with cost-benefit relationships. Federal
Rule 102 refers to construing the rules "to secure... elimination of
unjustifiable expense and delay,"' and Federal Rule 403 permits the
exclusion of evidence on "considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence."' American
evidence professors would also point to various notice provisions
designed to forbid costly surprises at trial, such as in Federal Rules
412-15, 609, and 807.' They would point to a series of rules excluding evidence of specific instances of conduct largely because such
presentations, and the responses they would engender, are rarely
worth the cost. Finally, they would mention how Federal Rules 408
and 410 are motivated in part by the desire to facilitate compromises, in large measure because compromises are more efficient
than trials. 8
What is noteworthy about Posner's argument is not the trivial
point that one can discern some economic value from some of the
rules of evidence. Rather, notwithstanding Posner's qualification
that his work is eclectic, it is his relentlessness in pursuing the implications of certain formalisms that is striking. We think aspects of
these portions of his argument are problematic, and we concentrate on them. In our judgment, they tend to confirm the veritistic
value of the approach of naturalized epistemology and the concomitant skepticism with which implications of a priori reasoning
should be approached.
1. The Implicationsof Rational Choice Theory
Posner's analysis relies heavily on a simplistic expected utility
model of decisionmaking, which is what he means by "rational
choice" in that article. According to his model, as the expected cost
of an act goes up, the incidence of that act goes down in a direct relationship.' There are more sophisticated versions of rational

75Fed. R. Evid. 102.
76Fed. R. Evid. 403.
Fed. R. Evid. 412-15, 609, 807.
'8 Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence § 4.25 (1999).
79 See Posner, supra note 4. This is the premise of virtually his entire article.
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choice, and Posner is an expert in them, ° but they are not employed in his article. The model of behavior he does employ is
common in much a priori theorizing about human behavior in the
law and economics literature,8 but the critical question is its relationship to reality. Although one can hardly tell from the legal
literature, Posner certainly knows that economists who actually
do empirical work view simple expected utility models as relatively
poor predictors of behavior. For example, a review of the tax literature in the Journal of Economic Literature concludes that
simple expected utility models are poor predictors of reality and
rather imperfect guides to policy.' The authors of the review suggest that the economic models, when used to advance the goal of
deterrence, may not even be close approximations of reality: "This
is an important area, because the econometric results to date suggest that the use of a 'stick' to enforce compliance with tax laws
may not have any long-run impact."' The authors conclude that
there must be something other than simple expected utility that
explains why people pay their taxes. They speculate that factors
not considered by the microeconomists, such as morals and social
dynamics, may have great impact on the economic models but
point out that research exploring these factors is currently lacking.'
Recently, Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini empirically tested the
predictions of the utility maximizer model of human behavior in a
field study involving a day care, and the results were disconfirming.
Parents arrived late to collect their children, which imposed costs
on the school. When a money fine was introduced, the number of

See, e.g., Posner, supra note 61. "Rational choice" is often employed in the legal

literature as though it referred to a well-defined, unproblematic entity. In fact it is
neither well-defined nor unproblematic. See, e.g., Isaac Levi, Review Essays, 97 J.
Phil. 387 (2000) (reviewing James M. Joyce, The Foundations of Causal Decision
Theory (1999)) (explaining some of the controversies within the field of rational

choice).
"IE.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic
Analysis, 111 Harv L. Rev. 869 (1998).
2But see Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The "New" Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics,
Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 Cornell L. Rev. 739 (2000) (discussing more

complex models).
James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. Econ. Literature 818, 855 (1998).
Id. at 844.
Id. at 852.
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late arriving parents actually increased significantly.' Similarly,
Professor Erling Eide cites multiple factors beyond the threat of
economic sanction that explain behavior:
The reasons why people are more or less law-abiding are manofold [sic].... In criminometric studies it might be useful to
distinguish between norm variables (representing desires for
various courses of action), want (or taste) variables (representing preferences for various outcomes), ability variables
(representing intellectual, psychic and physical characteristics),
punishment variables (representing the probability and severity
of punishment), individual economic variables (representing legal and illegal income opportunities), and environmental
variables (other than punishment and economic variables).'
From this complex array of variables, Posner has employed
one-the effect of the imposition of costs upon behavior-and has
addressed neither how that variable may interact with any others,
nor the implications of the interactions for the law of evidence.
We see little point to this as an explanatory exercise. Rather
plainly, what matters is how people and the system behave in fact,
not how they are predicted to behave by the application of formal
tools, no matter how elegant, for which there is substantial discomfiting, if not disconfirming, data. We respectfully suggest that, to be
useful, an explication of the law of evidence must deal with the disturbances to the expected utility theory caused by the data rather
than simply ignoring them without explanation. Posner's article is

,6Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1 (2000).
81Erling Eide, Economics of Criminal Behavior: Survey and Bibliography, at 21-22

(U. of Oslo, Inst. for Private Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No. C 5).
Other empiricists concur. In his 1990 book, Why People Obey The Law, Professor
Tom R. Tyler reports the results of a study testing the contribution of various
variables to the decision of individuals to obey the law, including the deterrent
efficacy of the law. As he summarizes the data:
The findings of the Chicago study also support the suggestion that the influence
of deterrence on compliance may be overrated. The Chicago study used an
approach to measurement patterned after that of Paternoster and a similarly
designed panel study, and found little evidence of deterrence effects. Although
the study does not question the assumption that deterrence works, other studies
may well.
Tom R. Tyler, Why People Obey the Law 67 (1990) (citation omitted).
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not very helpful to the extent it rests without explanation upon an
overly simplistic version of rational choice theory.'
2. Bayes' Theorem and the Meaning of Relevance
Posner cautiously suggests Bayes' Theorem may be a useful heuristic in analyzing juridical proof, a point that others have made
before him' and with which we agree. As much more than a casual
heuristic, however, Bayes' Theorem has little to recommend it in
the juridical context, as we have previously discussed.' Posner also
endorses the use of Bayes' Theorem to explicate the meaning of
relevancy, developed in the legal literature by Professor Richard
Lempert.91
As elegant as the Bayesian theory of relevance is, naturalized
epistemology reminds us to ask how it comports with the facts
about human reasoning-both what people actually do and what
they can do. An obvious truth (obvious by both analysis and inspection) is that virtually all evidence is highly contingent.'
Accordingly, a useful likelihood ratio cannot be formed to test the
relevancy of a piece of evidence unless all the other pieces of evidence, as well as how they all interact, are already known. That is
Curiously, one of the strongest proponents in the legal literature of the theory of
behavior that Posner employs in his evidence article, Professor Steven Shavell,
apparently has conceded when writing in an economic journal that the theory he
propounds so vigorously in the legal literature does not accurately portray the reality
of deterrence and that more study on other variables is needed. Shavell, with
Professor A. Mitchell Polinsky, writes:
We also have not discussed social norms as a general alternative to law
enforcement in channeling individuals' behavior. By a social norm, we mean a
rule of behavior (for example, that people should not litter or should not
discriminate on the basis of race) whose violation may have the following
consequences: the violator may experience an internal sanction (guilt, remorse);
others may impose on the violator external, extra-legal social sanctions (gossip,
ostracism); and others may experience utility or disutility from punishment of
the violator. There is an emerging literature on social norms that seems worth
amplifying because of the influence that social norms have on behavior, because
of their role as a substitute for and supplement to formal laws, and also because
of the possibility that laws themselves might influence social norms.
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement
of Law, 38 J. Econ. Literature 45,73 (2000).
" Kaplan, supra note 3, at 1083-86; Lempert, supra note 3, at 1022-27.
'o See

supra Section III.B.

'Posner, supra note 4, at 1522 n.95 (citing Lempert, supra note 3, at 1025).
92 See Allen, supra note 49, at 270.
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why likelihood ratios are not discussed after evidence is produced.
Instead substantive arguments that describe how the bit of evidence in question will be integrated into the fabric of the party's
story are discussed. Posner recognizes the point-"Evidence that is
cumulative must be distinguished, however, from evidence necessary to complete a mosaic of proof. A costly bit of 'additional'
evidence might be cost-justified because it fits in with other evidence to establish the truth convincingly.""-but he confuses the
rule with the exception. The issue of relevancy generally is whether
evidence fits into a "mosaic of proof"; this is not limited to the issue of cumulative evidence. Obversely, only in exceptional cases
can a plausible case be made for testing admissibility by a Bayesian
likelihood ratio.'
By focusing on the formalism of Bayes' Theorem, Posner's
analysis also misses the deeper significance of the relevancy rules.
The relevancy rules, unlike the formal Bayesian analysis, recognize
that relevancy determinations require extensive substantive knowledge of the entire case to be made intelligently and thus cannot be
reduced to algorithms like Bayes' Theorem. That means that relevancy determinations are very difficult to make intelligently prior
to possessing that knowledge. Even with all the evidence, people
can reasonably disagree about whether any particular piece of evidence rationally fits into a "mosaic" or not. Thus, relevancy rulings
must be made cautiously and contingently, and they must be made
in a manner respectful of the bifurcated nature of factfinding when
a jury is involved. They must be made, in other words, along the
lines that Federal Rule 104(b) lays out-a rule that makes considerable sense viewed as instantiating the "mosaic" view of relevancy
but that bears a Bayesian interpretation only awkwardly.95

3

1

Posner, supra note 4, at 1524.

9 DNA evidence is the contemporary standard example, but it is a complete

mystery whether DNA evidence can be incorporated algorithmically into trials in a
manner that increases the accuracy of decision. "Algorithmically" here is an
important qualifier. Obviously DNA evidence can easily be a primary determinant of
the truth of competing stories, but for such a purpose no formal analysis of the type
discussed here need be employed.
9"The definition of relevancy in Federal Rule 401 can be read as consistent with a
Bayesian test for relevancy, but it is also consistent with any imaginable rational test
for relevancy as well.

HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 1520 2001

2001]

NaturalizedEpistemology

1521

3. Rootless Theorizing
Another concern about Posner's economic approach to the law
of evidence can be summarized in the phrase "rootless theorizing."
The results of formal systems are dependent upon their axioms and
rules of deduction. The relationship between the results of deductions and reality, however, depends on the truth of the axioms and
the nature of the rules of deduction. Posner's focus on the logical
implications of formalisms may deflect consideration from the
truth content of his larger enterprise. We give two examples of this.
First, in summing up his comparison of different systems of adjudication, Posner notes that in the United States:
[T]he conviction rate is lower in bench trials than in jury trials.
This is significant because in most states the decision in a criminal case as to whether to be tried by a judge or by a jury is
entirely the defendant's. If juries are less accurate guilt determiners than judges, innocent defendants will choose to be tried
by judges rather than run the risk of jury mistake, while guilty
defendants will choose to be tried by juries, hoping for a mistake. The acquittal rate should therefore be higher in bench
trials-and it is.

This appears to be empirical vindication of the economic model,
but it all rests upon the assertion that "in most states the decision
in a criminal case as to whether to be tried by a judge or by a jury is
entirely the defendant's." This is false. Posner has provided an
economic rationale for an incorrect proposition:'
At present, some states provide for a defendant's unilateral
right to a bench trial. Other states require prosecutorial and
court consent. Still others allow for a defendant to waive a jury
trial in all but capital cases or cases where the death penalty is
sought. In some jurisdictions, the court must consent to the defendant's waiver. In other states, the court accepts the
defendant's waiver only upon consent of the Government. In
9 Posner, supra note 4, at 1501 (footnote omitted).
17Posner has said in his helpful and generous comments on a draft of this article that
this is not an "economic" argument. We so classify it because it is a standard
application of the simple expected utility model that is at the core of Posner's
"economic" arguments about evidence. If we misclassify it, it remains nonetheless an
interesting example of rootless theorizing, which in any event is our main subject in
this Section.
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one state, Ohio, if the defendant's jury waiver is proposed either shortly before or during the trial, the trial judge and
prosecutor must consent. One other state, North Carolina, does
not appear to permit the accused to waive a jury trial in a felony
case under any circumstances.'
9 Adam H. Kurland, Providing a Federal Criminal Defendant with a Unilateral
Right to a Bench Trial: A Renewed Call to Amend Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 23(a), 26 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 309, 321-23 (1993) (footnotes omitted). We
have updated Kurland's research on a defendant's right to waive a jury trial in all fifty
states and D.C.
Only eight states give defendants the unilateral right to a bench trial. See Conn.
Gen. St. Ann. § 54-82 (West 2001); 725 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/103-6 (West 1992);
Iowa R. Crim. P. 16(1); La. Const. art. I, § 17; La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 780
(West 1998); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 8-305 (1998); Md. Code Ann., Crim.
Causes R. 4-246 (a)-(b) (2001); Thomas v. State, 598 A.2d 789, 793 (Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 1991); Neb. Const. art. I, § 6; State v. Carpenter, 150 N.W.2d 129, 131 (Neb.
1967); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 606:7 (1986); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2945.05
(Anderson 1999); Ohio R. Crim. P. 23(A).
In twenty-five states and the District of Columbia, defendants must receive
prosecutorial and court consent to waive a jury trial. See Ala. R. Crim. P. 18.1(b);
Alaska R. Crim. P. 23(a); Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 17; Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.1; Del. Super.
Ct. Crim. R. 23(a); D.C. Code Ann. § 16-705(a) (1997); D.C. Super. Ct. R. Crim. P.
23(a); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-37-1 to 2 (Michie 1998); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3403(1)
(1995); Ky. R. Crim. P. 9.26(1); Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 763.3 (West 2001); Nev.
Rev. Stat. Ann. 175.011 (Michie 1999); State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 43 (N.M. 1990);
N.D. R. Crim. P. 23(a) (2001); Okla. Const. art. II, § 19; Valega v. City of Okla. City,
755 P.2d 118, 119 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Crawford v. Brown, 536 P.2d 988, 990
(Okla. Crim. App. 1975); Or. Const. art. I, § 11; Or. Rev. Stat. § 136.001 (1999); Pa. R.
Crim. P. 620; S.C. R. Crim. P. 14(b); S.D. Codified Laws § 23A-18-1 (Michie 1998);
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-205(a) (1997); Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 1.13
(Vernon 1977); Utah R. Crim. P. 17(c); Vt. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Va. Const. art. I, § 8; W.
Va. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Wis. Const. art. I, § 5; Wis. Stat. Ann. § 972.02(1) (West 1998);
Wyo. R. Crim. P. 23(a).
Ten states do not allow a defendant to waive a jury trial in capital crimes or (in
some cases) when the death penalty is sought. See Ark. R. Crim. P. 31.4; La. Const.
art. I, § 17; La. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 780 (West 1998); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann.
ch. 263, § 6 (West 2000); Evans v. State, 547 So. 2d 38,40 (Miss. 1989); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 606:7 (1986); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10 (McKinney
1993); Or. Const. art. I, § 11; Tex. Crim. Proc. Code Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977); Vt.
R. Crim. P. 23(a); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 10.01.060 (West 1990).
Ten states require only court consent before allowing defendants to waive a jury
trial. See McCorquodale v. State, 211 S.E.2d 577, 581-82 (Ga. 1974); Palmer v. State,
25 S.E.2d 295, 300-01 (Ga. 1943); Haw. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 806-61 (Michie 1999); Haw.
R. Penal Proc. 23(a); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 2114 (West 1980); Me. R. Crim. P.
23(a); Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 263, § 6 (West 2000) (incorporating 1992 amendment
to the effect that "consent to ... waiver shall not be denied in the district court or the
Boston municipal court if the waiver is filed before the case is transferred for jury trial
to the appropriate jury session," as long as when there is more than one defendant, all
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Posner's argument, in addition to resting on an apparently false
premise, demonstrates the manipulability of formal arguments. An
equally plausible variation of his argument can be made that the
evidence of higher acquittal rates by judges demonstrates that juries are, and are believed to be, more, not (as in Posner's original
argument) less, accurate decisionmakers. If juries are believed to
be more accurate decisionmakers, innocent parties will choose juries, but prosecutors will read the signal and dispose of many cases
of innocent defendants in one manner or another (such as dismissal
or really good plea bargains). Pre-trial proceedings will take a large
proportion of the innocent defendants who would have had jury
trials out of the system, leaving a much higher proportion of guilty
defendants going to jury trials who are subsequently found guilty
by highly accurate juries. A high proportion of guilty individuals
hoping for a mistake will also be tried by judges, and their lower
conviction rate proves that judges are less accurate decisionmakers
than juries. Is any of this true? Who knows? Knowledge is not advanced by this kind of reasoning.
The second example is Posner's discussion of what is known as
the Blue Bus hypothetical and whether naked statistical evidence
suffices for a verdict. Posner constructs an economic explanation
premised on the assertion that "[t]he law's answer is 'no."'" Posner
relies on some of the evidentiary literature for this conclusion and
° Unfortunately,
on the case of Smith v. Rapid Transit."
Smith is difficult to view as a "statistical evidence" case ....
The plaintiff did not rely on any such evidence. She merely asof them assent to a bench trial); Mass. R. Crim. P. 19(a); Mo. Const. art. I, § 22(a);
Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01(2); NJ. R. Gen. Applic. 1:8-1(a); N.Y. Const. art. I, § 2; N.Y.
Crim. Proc. Law § 320.10 (McKinney 1993); R.I. R. Crim. P. 23(a); Wash. Rev. Code

Ann. § 10.01.060 (West 1990).
Six states require only prosecutorial consent for waiver of jury trial. See Cal. Const.
art. I, § 16; Colo. Rev. Stat. § 16-10-101 (2000); People v. Dist. Ct., 843 P.2d 6, 9-11

(Colo. 1992) (holding that prosecutorial consent is normally required but that the
court can allow waiver of a jury trial over the objection of the prosecution); Fla. R.
Crim. P. 3.260; Idaho Const. art. I, § 7; Idaho Crim. R. 23(a); Evans v. State, 547 So.
2d 38, 40 (Miss. 1989); Robinson v. State, 345 So. 2d 1044, 1045 (Miss. 1977); Mont.

Const. art. II, § 26; Mont. Code Ann. §46-16-110(3) (1999).
Ohio requires court and prosecutorial consent when the waiver is requested during

trial. See Ohio R. Crim. P. 23(a). North Carolina does not permit waiver of jury trial
under any circumstances. See N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 15A-1201 (West 2000).
19Posner, supra note 4, at 1508.
10158 N.E.2d 754 (Mass. 1945).
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serted that she was forced off the road by a bus and in addition
proved that Rapid Transit, Inc. was the only bus company operating regularly on the road where the accident occurred. In
appraising the strength of the evidence, the court concluded
that it was a matter of "conjecture" who owned the bus and that
"[tihe most that can be said of the evidence in the instant case is
that perhaps the mathematical chances somewhat favor the
proposition that a bus of the defendant caused the accident.
This was not enough."''
The language of the case is hardly the language of rejection of
the adequacy of statistical proffers. The "perhaps" alone should be
sufficient to make that point clear. In any event, cases raising clean
issues of naked statistical evidence are rare, perhaps even nonexistent, but the impression from the cases is inconsistent with Posner's
assumption. An example is the United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,' on remand from the Supreme Court:

Plaintiffs do not attempt to show causation directly; instead,
they rely on experts who present circumstantial proof of causation. Plaintiffs' experts testify that Bendectin is a teratogen
because it causes birth defects when it is tested on animals, because it is similar in chemical structure to other suspected
teratogens, and because statistical studies show that Bendectin
use increases the risk of birth defects. Modem tort law permits
such proof, but plaintiffs must nevertheless carry their traditional burden; they must prove that their injuries were the
result of the accused cause and not some independent factor. In
the case of birth defects, carrying this burden is made more difficult because we know that some defects-including limb
reduction defects-occur even when expectant mothers do not
take Bendectin, and that most birth defects occur for no known
reason.
California tort law requires plaintiffs to show not merely that
Bendectin increased the likelihood of injury, but that it more
likely than not caused their injuries. In terms of statistical proof,
this means that plaintiffs must establish not just that their
mothers' ingestion of Bendectin increased somewhat the likeli101
Allen, supra note 44, at 429-30 n.67 (quoting Smith, 58 N.E.2d at 755).
'1

43 F.3d 1311 (9th Cir. 1995).
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hood of birth defects, but that it more than doubled it--only
then can it be said that Bendectin is more likely than not the
source of their injury. Because the background rate of limb reduction defects is one per thousand births, plaintiffs must show
that among children of mothers who took Bendectin the incidence of such defects was more than two per thousand.ln°
Posner's economic argument again appears to be founded on a
misconception of the law-the most that can be said of the cases
favorable to his argument is that the adequacy of a naked statistical
case is an open question-and thus he has constructed an economic
rationale for an arguably nonexistent entity, demonstrating the
noteworthy flexibility but not the veritistic prodigiousness of his
technique.
Posner concludes this section of his article with another economic argument. This is based on the hypothetical Blue Bus case,
where the plaintiff brings evidence that he was hit by a bus, and
fifty-one percent of the buses on this route were owned by company A while forty-nine percent of the buses were owned by
company B.1"'
There is still another objection to allowing the bus case to go to
the jury. If B, though responsible in fact for almost half the accidents, is never held liable and A is always held liable, A will
have a big incentive to be careful and B little or no incentive to
be careful. As a result, over time, more than half the accidents
will be caused by B, increasing the error rate resulting from allowing juries to base decisions on the ratio of the companies'
buses on the route in question. Eventually, A, having higher li-

'. Id. at 1320 (footnote and citation omitted). Another example is Kramer v.
Weedhopper of Utah, 490 N.E.2d 104 (INl. App. Ct. 1986), which involved a bolt that
allegedly sheared off, causing harm. Ninety percent of the bolts were supplied by
defendants; ten percent were supplied by another supplier, not part of the litigation.
Id. at 106. No other evidence could identify which supplier supplied the bolt in
question. The trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant; the appellate
court reversed, holding that this presented a sufficient case to go to the jury. Id. at
105, 107-08. Whether a relative risk approach to the meaning of a preponderance of
the evidence is sensible is a different question. See, e.g., Sander Greenland & James
M. Robins, Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability of Causation, 40 Jurimetrics J.
321 (2000).
'l Posner, supra note 4, at 1508.
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ability costs, will probably withdraw from the route; the rule on
burden of proof will have created a monopoly! 5
Our doubts about the value of Posner's form of a priori reasoning for explicating the law of evidence are well captured by this
paragraph. Taking the argument on its own terms-terms which we
reject, of course-the consequence Posner fears will occur only if A
is remarkably stupid. In the world Posner is hypothesizing, all A
need do is take at most three buses out of service. If A takes three
buses out of service, the ratio of buses now favors A (it changes
from 51/49 to 48/49), and B will henceforth be held liable for all accidents."° Of course, another economic fear might now arise: B,
also not being massively stupid, might respond by taking two of its
buses out of service. Perhaps the prediction would now be that
"bus reduction" would become recursive, eventually resulting in
only one bus company with only one bus driven by a very careful
driver, which would surely not serve the needs of the community!
Therefore, the logic would go, allowing verdicts based on naked
statistics is not economically sensible.
Neither a monopoly nor the essential elimination of the industry
would result from allowing probabilistic verdicts. If such verdicts
began to accumulate inaccurately against bus companies, they
would invest in precautions, many of which are cheaply available.
Posner might respond that we are making economic arguments:
Both error reduction and subjective expected utility may be advanced by permitting decision on naked statistics, and individuals
will intelligently assess the value of investments in precaution. Our
claim, however, is not that there is no role for policies concerned
with errors and costs, nor is it that incentives are irrelevancies.
Rather, the point is to critique a form of a priori reasoning that is
curiously out of touch with the phenomenon supposedly under investigation.'"
'-1 Id.

at 1510.
106 Or, if company A is really smart, it will take exactly two buses out of service. If
both companies have forty-nine buses in service, the probability of liability would be
exactly 0.5, meaning plaintiffs injured by buses could never recover.
MI The economics analysis is not redeemed by the argument that some economists,
including Posner, make to the effect that empirical adequacy of a model or its
assumptions does not matter; only the predictions of the model do. We have
attempted to show that the tools employed by Posner permit virtually any prediction
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More importantly, as employed by Posner in this context, the
technique seems curiously out of touch with the essential justification for the technique in the first place. Apart from aesthetics, the
primary value of any formalization is its capacity to generate true
(or, within pure mathematics, valid) answers. A "formalization"
that can be used to justify inconsistent states of affairs is, in our
view, not a "formalization" at all. In any event, it serves no obvious
purpose. Typically an argument or approach is less, not more,
valuable if more aspects of different problems can be defended or
explained with it. At the limit, an argument that explains everything explains nothing. This is the root of the common complaint
that law and economics work tends toward being ad hoc'--a complaint that, regardless of the general utility of microeconomics for
explicating the law, is borne out by much of Posner's argument
here. We do not mean by this to consign economics, so far as the
law of evidence is concerned, to the trash bin of history. This would
be an eminently ridiculous proposition. Costs, benefits, and incentives are obviously material concerns to the structuring of dispute
resolution. As we said at the beginning of this Section, our point is
considerably narrower-to analyze the contributions of this one
expression of economic analysis.
D. The Relative PlausibilityTheory and Naturalized Epistemology
Not all theorizing about evidence is a priori. One example is the
relative plausibility theory that was constructed in response to the
empirical and analytical inadequacies of the expected utility and
Bayesian approaches."a The critical insight of the relative plausibility theory is that legal fact finding involves a determination of the
comparative plausibility of the parties' explanations offered at trial
rather than a determination of whether discrete elements are found
to be made. Moreover, he has apparently made some false predictions. It is not very
surprising that such consequences result from disregarding the empirical adequacy of
models.

'll For a discussion, see Mark Blaug, The Methodology of Economics or How
Economics Explains 51-136 (2d ed. 1992). For an extended critique of Posner's
methodology, see Jeanne Schroeder, Just So Stories: Posnerian Economic Methodology
(Cardozo Law School, Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies, Working Paper
No. 013, June 2000), http://papers.ssm.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=229874.
"1 See Allen, supra note 46; Ronald J. Allen, The Nature of Juridical Proof, 13
Cardozo L. Rev. 373,381-82 (1991).
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to a specific probability. In civil cases the factfinder is to identify
the most plausible account of the relevant events, whereas in
criminal cases the prosecution must provide a plausible account of
guilt and show that there is no plausible account of innocence. The
structure of liability is provided by the formal elements, but that is
different from the proof process, which proceeds in a largely comparative fashion over the stories advanced by the parties. Once the
most plausible account of the relevant events is determined, liability flows deductively from the formal structure of the law. The
relative plausibility theory as developed in the legal literature bears
a close relationship to the empirical work on jury decisionmaking
done by Professors Nancy Pennington and Reid Hastie. n° It also
bears a close relationship to the work done on hypothesis comparison through the use of connectionist approaches, such as in the
work of Professor Paul Thagard.'" From the perspective of naturalized epistemology, there are several advantages of the relative
plausibility theory including:"'
" It appears to explain what factfinders actually do.
* It unmistakably explains what advocates actually do at
trial.
" It avoids the formal difficulties of Bayesianism, as it has
so far been developed in the literature.
" The paradoxes of proof are marginalized because they are
distributed evenly over both sides of a dispute.
• Computational complexity is largely eliminated as a problem because litigation focuses on the plausibility of
coherent stories advanced by the parties rather than on
discrete items of evidence.
In addition to better explaining the basic structure of trials than
its competitors, the relative plausibility theory also produces falsifiable predictions, a number of which are suggested above. One
prediction is that actual litigation proceeds in a comparative fashion. Support for this prediction of the relative plausibility theory is
ubiquitous in the case law. Examples could be listed endlessly ben10
See Nancy Pennington & Reid Hastie, A Cognitive Theory of Juror Decision
Making: The Story Model, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 519 (1991).
H E.g., Paul Thagard, Conceptual Revolutions 25-27 (1992).
12 For an extended defense of the relative plausibility theory, see Allen, supra note
46; Allen, supra note 109.
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cause virtually all trials reduce to the comparison of competing
claims. For example, in MCI Communications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,"' the court wrote: "Considering the
trial evidence and argument as well as the instructions tendered,
the jury's obvious choice was between a nationwide market (espoused by MCI) or a more limited market (advocated by
AT&T).""' 4 The jury's "obvious choice" was not between whether
the plaintiff had proved its allegations by a preponderance of the
evidence or not but between the two markets espoused by the parties. Swaiian v. General Motors Corp."' dealt with whether an
accident was caused by a faulty axle, as alleged by the plaintiff. The
defense was driver error as a result of intoxication. The trial court
excluded the defendant's evidence of intoxication. On appeal, the
issue was not presented as whether the excluded evidence was admissible to demonstrate that causation had not been proven by a
preponderance of the evidence but, instead, whether the evidence
was admissible as proof of an alternative story:
Armed with this evidence, the jury could have concluded that
driver error contributed significantly to, if not caused, decedent's accident. As it was, the jury was presented with the
following factual scenario: the two month old vehicle was travelling down a straight, flat road in good weather when it swayed
and went out of control for no apparent reason. The only explanation proferred was that there was a defect in one of the
axles. Without the evidence of intoxication the jury was left
with no reason for the loss of control other than Swajian's allegations.' 6

F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1174.

1-'708
"4

IL916 F.2d 31 (1st Cir. 1990).

Id. at 34. Still another example is Wyletal v. United States, 907 F.2d 49 (7th Cir.

116

1990):
Josephine Wyletal, a lively eighty-five year old widow with a cataract in her left
eye, was walking eastbound on the north side of Oakton Street in Skokie,
Illinois at 11:00 a.m. on a cloudy day in November. She was not wearing her
glasses. At the same time, a letter carrier for the United States Postal Service
was hurriedly delivering mail by foot heading west on the north side of Oakton
Street. As Mrs. Wyletal proceeded along the sidewalk, the postal carrier
emerged from a recessed doorway. Neither saw the other and they collided
[resulting in damages]....
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Inconsistent pleading cases also provide support for the relative
plausibility theory by typically instructing the jury to decide which
story is most plausible. In McCormick v. Kopmann,"7 the court upheld the trial judge who had sent a case to the jury containing
inconsistent claims." ' In one claim, the plaintiff alleged that one defendant was liable for having killed her husband and that the
husband was not contributorily negligent as a result of being drunk
(she alleged he was sober).119 In another claim against different defendants, she alleged liability under the Dramshop Act for having
sold sufficient alcohol to her husband to render him intoxicated.20
The jury was essentially instructed to return a verdict against the
party-plaintiff or either defendant-most likely liable for the
event,2 just as the relative plausibility theory would predict.
In his economic critique of evidence law, Posner adopts aspects
of the relative plausibility theory,'" although he implicitly rejects it
in one particular that bears upon cases like McCormick. He asserts
that if
[Tihe plaintiff's story had a probability of .42 of being true, the
defendant's story a probability of .30 of being true, and the
probability that another story or stories is true was .28, then the
plaintiff should lose because he has failed to prove that his story
is more likely than not true. ' 2
Applied to McCormick, this means that the plaintiff would have to
show one of the defendants to be more likely than not liable. This
is wrong, as the case at least implicitly recognizes. It is instructive
to explicate the error, however.
One either knows or does not know the implications of the story
or set of stories comprising the missing 0.28 probability. If these
implications are known, each party should get the benefit of the
During the bench trial, Mrs. Wyletal and the postal carrier presented
conflicting testimony as to how the collision occurred. Mrs. Wyletal testified she
was hit from the back, while the postal carrier testified they collided head-on.
Id. at 49-50.
117161 N.E.2d 720 (Ill. App. Ct. 1959).
11s

Id. at 725, 732.

119Id.
12

at 724.

Id.

121Id.

at 725.

1- See Posner, supra note 4, at 1512 & n.74.
123Id. at 1513.
14See

supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text.
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probability associated with the story or stories that favor them. If
the implications are not known, there is no good reason to systematically disfavor plaintiffs by attributing all the ambiguity to them.
In civil cases, given mutual discovery, the parties can be expected
to search for and produce evidence of whatever stories they think
can plausibly support their legal claims. Indeed, the only argument
for systematically disfavoring plaintiffs is an unpersuasive one that
posits plaintiffs will bring actions where the probability of their
story is extremely low but where defendants cannot respond." This
conceptual problem has no obvious empirical counterpart. If a
plaintiff can make a plausible claim, even if in the abstract lowprobability case, and a defendant simply has no response, under
the present rules the plaintiff is likely to win. In any event, ignoring
the ambiguity that no party, remember, wishes to litigate will advance all theories of trials (for example, risk reduction, optimizing
expected returns, fairness). The inconsistent claims cases implicitly
recognize this point.
Posner's argument that all ambiguity should be allocated against
plaintiffs and the state126 is another interesting example of how apparently straightforward, logical, perhaps "economic" arguments
are often unresponsive to the actual conditions about which they
purport to be theorizing. Plaintiffs could not possibly establish that
of all the ways that the universe might have been on the day and at
the place in question, half plus one favor liability. The analogous
requirement for criminal cases is also impossible to establish. Take
as an example any criminal case in any populated area, such as the
O.J. Simpson murder case. There were roughly seven million people in the greater Los Angeles area on the night in question. Were
Posner's argument an accurate explication of the law, all Simpson's
12%
This

is also one of two reasons why ambiguity should not be assessed against the

state in criminal cases: First, the state is not likely to go around looking for false

criminal charges that it can prosecute solely because the wrongly accused defendant
will not have evidence supporting his innocence. The second reason is that in criminal
cases a low probability of guilt will rationally give rise to the belief that some other
explanation than the guilt of the defendant is true, and therefore the defendant
should be acquitted, a point that can be brought out by counsel. The relative
plausibility theory is not falsified by analogous factfinding in civil cases, either, as the
factfinder's own knowledge and experience is relevant to fashioning the possible
stories
explaining the litigated events.
12 6
Posner, supra note 4, at 1513.
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counsel would have had to do is present to the jury with the phone
book of the relevant area and put it to the prosecution to eliminate
all these alternative hypotheses. Unless one knows-which here
means has sufficient evidence to establish-that the probabilities of
these alternative hypotheses are zero, each must count in the defendant's favor. It would be quite astonishing if the cumulative
probability of approximately seven million low-probability events
does not equate with reasonable doubt."n
That defense attorneys do not pursue the logical implications of
Posner's argument strongly suggests that his argument is false as a
proposition about the phenomenon under investigation. By contrast, it is good evidence in favor of the factual accuracy of the
relative plausibility theory and in favor of the idea that the juridical
world is deeply comparative in the sense advanced by the relative
plausibility model."
Various decisions of the Seventh Circuit, including three opinions authored by Judge Posner, are consistent with the relative
plausibility theory.
First, Spitz v. Commissioner" involved a prosecution for tax
fraud."3 The trial court was unimpressed with the taxpayers' expla12 Under the relative plausibility theory, by contrast, the question is whether any of
the individuals in the area plausibly committed the crime. In the absence of evidence
that any one did, it would not be plausible. This highlights another difference between
the relative plausibility theory and the Bayesian approach-a difference that corrects
a false conventional belief about criminal trials. The conventional belief is that
defendants do not have to raise alternative theories or provide evidence. While
formally this is true, functionally it is false. The reason it is false is explained by the
relative plausibility theory. If theories supported by evidence are not presented to the
factfinder, they exist only to the extent they preexist in the factfinder's mind.
128 For discussions of these and many related issues, see sources cited supra note 109;
Ronald J. Allen et al., Probability and Proof in State v. Skippen An Internet
Exchange, 35 Jurimetics J. 277 (1995). It also bears noting that Posner's qualification
of the relative plausibility theory in the case of multiple possible explanations
eliminates the legal significance of the theory. In any case in which the probability of
the plaintiffs case does not exceed 0.5, the total probability of the alternative
explanations, whether advanced by the defendant or not, must meet or exceed 0.5,
resulting in a decision for the defendant. It is just this manner of viewing the
preponderance of the evidence standard that the relative plausibility theory critiques
and for which it provides a substitute. In any event, nothing turns on whether there is
any legal significance to the theory under Posner's qualification; the proper issue is its
empirical validity.
129

954 F.2d 1382 (7th Cir. 1992).

1-1Id. at 1383.
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nations.' In reversing, the Seventh Circuit, per Judge Posner,
commented that "in general and in this instance the plausibility of
an explanation depends on the plausibility of the alternative explanations. However implausible the [defendants'] explanation might
seem in isolation, it does not stand alone, but must be compared
with the government's alternative explanation ... ",,132
Second, in Brackett v. Peters,33 the defendant was charged with
felony murder following the rape and beating of the victim.M While
in the hospital as a consequence of the assault, the eighty-five yearold victim's physical and mental condition deteriorated, and she
eventually died, having been asphyxiated by some food lodged in
her trachea.35 The question on appeal was whether a rational
finder of fact could have found that the defendant caused the death
of the victim. In affirming the conviction, Judge Posner, writing
for the court, commented that:
[T]here are dangers in inferring consequence from sequence.
But they are slight when as in this case the event not only follows the act closely in time but is the kind of event frequently
produced by the kind of act, and no persuasive evidence of an
alternative causal sequence is presented .... "'
Third, in United States v. Morales,38 the court, per Judge Posner,
reversed a conviction for firearm possession and remanded for a
new trial,' 39 asserting that:
The issue becomes: not was it highly likely beforehand that a
sequence such as that described by Officer Maher would actually occur, but, given that the gun and clip were found in the
sinks, was the prosecution's hypothesis as to how they got there

1"'
Id. at 1384.
r Id. at 1384-85 (citations omitted).
1111 F.3d 78 (7th Cir. 1993).

-.Id. at 79.
1. Id.

n Id.

Id.at 80.

"'

902 F.2d 604 (7th Cir. 1990).

1-19Id.

at 609.
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substantially more probable than the hypothesis that someone
other than Morales put them there?'40
Two instructions typically given to juries better support the relative plausibility theory than the elements approach. The first is that
jurors are to rely on their common sense,' 4 ' but doing so would
mean the jury would disregard the judge's instructions to find elements by a preponderance of the evidence and focus instead on the
competing claims of the parties. The other instruction is that jurors
are not to draw inferences until all the evidence is in.14 This instruction is a striking embarrassment to a Bayesian understanding
of the structure of litigation. The factfinders are explicitly instructed to do the opposite of what the Bayesian argument
requires. By contrast, this instruction is not at all in tension with
relative plausibility theory. Under the relative plausibility theory,
the objective is to test the explanatory power of the stories of the
parties, which might be put at risk by reaching conclusions too
hastily. The contrast between Bayesian and relative plausibility explications of juridical proof could not be more stark. This
instruction is devastating to the Bayesian arguments but is easily
explained by relative plausibility.
The data provided here are admittedly anecdotal. Nonetheless,
it is obvious both that there are considerable data supporting the
relative plausibility theory and that the theory could be falsified by
well-formulated studies.
The relative plausibility theory also explains many discrete aspects of the rules of evidence, a point deserving some elaboration.
Many aspects of trial implicitly embrace the relative plausibility
theory in order to advance the veritistic consequences at the heart
of naturalized epistemology. For example, various rules of completeness override technical regulatory or exclusionary rules of
evidence. These rules provide data to factfinders in conventional
story form by admitting surrounding material relevant to specific
140Id. at 608. For examples in opinions authored by other judges, see, e.g., United
States v. Crosby, 75 F.3d 1343,1347 (9th Cir. 1996); Wyletal v. United States, 907 F.2d
49,50 (7th Cir. 1990).
14,E.g., Comm'n on Pattern Jury Instructions, Dist. Judges Ass'n, 5th Cir., Pattern
Jury Instructions (Civil Cases) § 3.1, at 31 (1999).
,42E.g, Comm'n on Pattern Jury Instructions, Ass'n of Supreme Court Justices, 1
New York Pattern Jury Instructions-Civil 1 1.11, at 16 (1974).
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testimony. One example is Federal Rule 106: "When a writing or
recorded statement or part thereof is introduced by a party, an adverse party may require the introduction at that time of any other
part or any other writing or recorded statement which ought in
' Another
fairness to be considered contemporaneously with it."143
example is the res gestae rule, found in many jurisdictions, which
permits virtually any background matter to the litigated question to
be adduced in order to flesh out the relevant events, regardless of
the technical admissibility of the background material."' Still another example is the standard practice of trying conspirators jointly
"to give the jury a fuller picture of the scheme."145 The list continues. Motive is never an element but always admissible in criminal
cases, and for that matter in civil cases, and convictions are difficult
to obtain without proof of motive. Motive fills in the gaps and converts formal structures into human events. Federal Rule 612
provides that, "if a witness uses a writing to refresh memory for the
purpose of testifying," the writing is admissible regardless of exclusionary rules.146 Again, the result is to put an entire human episode
before the factfinder."' Opening statements and closing arguments
are also more consistent with the relative plausibility theory than
the elements model. Opening statements inform the factfinder of
the story to be told, and closing arguments attempt to demonstrate
that one story is more plausible than its competitors.
Some rules of evidence may appear inconsistent with the relative
plausibility model but in fact are not. For example, exclusionary
rules keep evidence from the jury, retarding the emergence of the
full picture, but there are few general exclusionary rules. Apart
from the constitutional exclusionary rules whose purpose is to vin4

. Fed. R. Evid. 106.
'"Edward W. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 288, at 835-36 (3d ed. 1984).
'

United States v. Taglia, 922 F.2d 413,417 (7th. Cir. 1991) (Posner, J.).

141

'46Fed. R. Evid. 612.
14, Another example of the completeness principle is the commonly-held belief

among criminal practitioners that defendants generally must testify to stand a
reasonable chance of acquittal. If the person most knowledgeable about the truth of
the state's case chooses not to testify, the inference is virtually irresistible that the

state's case is accurate. It is just this point that makes the admission of prior records
so controversial. Defendants must testify, but admitting prior records may engender
the sense that this particular defendant is someone who should be kept off the streets,
regardless of whether he committed this particular act. An error of a wrongful

conviction, in other words, is not much to be regretted.
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dicate rights, there are only two general exclusionary rules: relevancy and hearsay. Relevancy exclusions do keep information from
juries, but only that information that no person could reasonably
rely upon"4 or whose "danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury" substantially outweighs its probative
value. 49 This is a quite liberal standard for admission, and thus
quite supportive of the relative plausibility theory. Moreover, to
the extent the relevancy determinations exclude evidence, they do
so based on a veritistic rationale that the relative plausibility theory
also honors.
The treatment of hearsay under the Federal Rules is also consistent with the relative plausibility theory. The most important forms
of hearsay, admissions and prior statements, are largely excluded
from the definition of hearsay or are admitted under exceptions.'"
In addition, there are numerous explicit exceptions-twenty-eight
in the Federal Rules of Evidence-and a residual exception. 5 '
Moreover, the previously mentioned res gestae principle acts as a
catch-all rule of admission for many hearsay statements. The hearsay rule keeps only the rankest and least reliable form of evidence
from the factfinder, which is quite consistent with the relative plausibility theory and its veritistic implications. 52
Privilege rules do keep information from the jury, but even here
the inconsistency with our basic thesis is not striking. Most privilege rules are designed to sacrifice truth-seeking to other values,
and thus they are indifferent to the comparison of the conventional
view of the proof rules and the relative plausibility theory. Moreover, an important privilege-the attorney-client privilege-is best
understood as promoting rather than retarding the production of
information."'
See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 401; Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 78, § 4.2.

148

Fed. R. Evid. 403.

149

15See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 801(d).
- See Fed. R. Evid. 803, 804, 807.
152 In fact, there are even more hearsay exceptions. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 703

(allowing certain hearsay that is the basis of expert testimony). See generally Ronald
J. Allen, The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule to a Rule of Admission, 76 Minn. L. Rev.
797, 800 (1992) (concluding that the hearsay rule has been largely eroded by the
various exceptions).
153See Allen et al., supra note 60, at 361-62. The relative plausibility theory also
explains cross-examination. Cross-examination brings out more information and thus
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One set of rules-the burden of proof rules-is no more consistent with the relative plausibility theory than its competitors. Like
expected utility and Bayesian approaches, the relative plausibility
theory predicts that elements will not be the focus of decision at
trial. Both expected utility and Bayesian approaches, however,
view the question at trial as liability or not. The relative plausibility
theory predicts the focus at trial will be competing accounts of
what occurred. For the reasons already advanced, the relative plausibility theory does not suffer from the logical problems afflicting
its competitors, and considerable evidence of its accuracy can be
found in the cases. By contrast, virtually no such evidence can be
found for the other theories.
IV. NATURALIZED EPISTEMOLOGY AND THE SPECIFIC RULES OF

EVIDENCE

For any rule of evidence that has a veritistic rationale, we can
properly analyze that rule from the standpoint of social epistemology. That means, of course, asking an essentially empirical
question: Does this rule of inclusion or exclusion in fact increase
the likelihood that factfinders, given what they are actually like,
will achieve knowledge about disputed matters of fact? For ease of
reference, let us paraphrase this as asking: Does this rule of inclusion or exclusion maximize veritistic value? This, in fact, is
precisely the question we take many evidence scholars to be asking
already-albeit not framed in these precise terms, and albeit not by
those scholars attracted to the a priori formalisms discussed in Part
III. It is part of the argument of this paper, however, that this is the
question all evidence scholarship should be asking.
Many rules that on their face invite one kind of veritistic analysis
require a very different kind in practice. For example, Federal
Rule 404, on its face, excludes character evidence in most contexts,
though, in fact, the exception in Federal Rule 404(b) largely swallows the rule.'" Thus, while it might seem that we should ask
whether excluding character evidence maximizes veritistic value,
the real question is whether admitting it does. The same may be
said for the hearsay rule. Although on its face, the hearsay doctrine
facilitates the construction of stories, even if not quite the one to which a particular
party is attached.
14 See infra Section IV.C. (discussing Fed. R. Evid. 404).
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is a rule of exclusion, in reality it is a rule of admission: What the
advocate must really know is how to get the proferred hearsay admitted under one of the multitude of exceptions to the nominal
rule of exclusion.155 Thus, the pertinent veritistic question concerns
the veritistic credentials of the grounds on which hearsay is admitted, rather than the veritistic reasons for excluding it in most cases.
Continuing this theme, all of the following questions would fall
within the purview of the social epistemology approach to evidence:
* What standards of relevance (under Federal Rule 402" )
and their implementation (under Federal Rule 104'17)
would in fact maximize veritistic value?
* Are out-of-court statements based on present sense
impressions (which are admissible under Federal Rule
803(1)1") in fact more reliable, such that they do not need
to be tested with cross-examination under oath and with
the benefit for the trier of fact of evidence of demeanor?
What about out-of-court statements made for the purpose
of medical diagnosis or treatment (admissible under Federal Rule 803(4)..)? What about the other hearsay
exceptions?
" What kinds of statistical and probabilistic evidence are in
fact probative without being confusing and misleading
(and so are admissible under Federal Rule 403w)?
* How can statistical evidence be integrated with unquantifled evidence?
* What standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence
(under Federal Rule 702161) will in fact maximize veritistic
value (taking account of the cognitive limitations of both
judges who must apply the standard and jurors who must
weigh the evidence)?

55

See Fed. R. Evid. 802; Allen, supra note 152.
" Fed. R. Evid. 402
'

157Fed.

R. Evid. 104.

I- Fed. R. Evid. 803(1).
,59Fed. R. Evid. 803(4).
,10Fed. R. Evid. 403.
,6 1 Fed. R. Evid. 702.
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" What is the proper role for instructions on inferences,
presumptions, and comments on or summary of the evidence?
" Should jurors be instructed to take (or refrain from taking)
notes, to discuss the evidence among themselves prior to the
close of evidence at trial, to reach tentative conclusions, or
to ask questions at trial of witnesses, parties or lawyers?
In fact, however, all these questions central to the social epistemology enterprise present a threshold issue: To what extent is the
available empirical evidence probative as to expected veritistic values in the context of real trials? In other words, to what extent do
cognitive shortcomings that are manifest in the laboratory reflect
cognitive shortcomings that will not, in fact, be compensated for by
other aspects of the trial process-aspects such as group deliberation, cross-examination, and the like? These are serious questions
that threaten to cut short the social epistemology inquiry before it
gets started.
Fortunately, there are some answers. The best way to appreciate
them is by looking at a paradigmatic case of a social epistemology
inquiry into one particular area of the law of evidence.
A. The Case of Demeanor
In a well-known 1991 article, Professor Olin Guy Wellborn III
examined the empirical evidence concerning (as we would put it)
the instrumental value of demeanor evidence for maximizing veritistic value."2 As Wellborn comments:
The importance of demeanor as an indicator of credibility is
commonly cited as a premise of the general requirement of live
testimony, the hearsay rule, and the right of confrontation. The
importance placed upon demeanor information is highlighted
by the strict limits traditionally placed upon trial use of depositions and transcribed testimony taken in other proceedings. The
opportunity of the trier to observe the demeanor of witnesses is
a principal basis for the deference accorded by reviewing courts
to factual determinations of trial courts and hearing officers.

6

Olin Guy Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 Cornell L. Rev. 1075 (1991).
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The assumption that demeanor provides highly useful informa1
tion plays an important role in other procedural doctrines.
In fact, however, it appears that demeanor evidence has little instrumental value as a maximizer of veritistic value. "[T]he
experimental evidence indicates that ordinary observers do not
benefit from the opportunity to observe nonverbal behavior in
judging whether someone is lying."' In addition, "a good body of
experimental evidence consistently shows that jurors simply cannot
tell whether a witness's perception and memory are accurate....
[N]either verbal nor nonverbal cues are effectively employed....""
Wellborn, however, is appropriately cautious in his normative
recommendations in light of the empirical facts about demeanor
evidence. The conclusion he draws is neither that we should eliminate live testimony-such testimony may still maximize veritistic
value in factfinding, even if it does not enhance credibility determinations, and in any case, live testimony serves non-veritistic
purposes as well1 -nor that we should eliminate the hearsay rule
113Id. at 1077 (footnotes omitted).
164Id. at 1088; see id. at 1078 n.10, 1079 n.12 (citing the evidence discussed). See
generally Paul Ekman, Why Don't We Catch Liars? 63 Soc. Res. 801 (1996)
(discussing possible explanations for the phenomenon). For other recent work on this
topic, see, e.g., Thomas H. Feeley & Mark A. deTurck, Global Cue Usage in
Behavioral Lie Detection, 43 Comm. Q. 420 (1995). But see Mark A. deTurck &
Gerald R. Miller, Training Observers to Detect Deception: Effects of Self-Monitoring
and Rehearsal, 16 Hum. Comm. Res. 603 (1990) (finding that training can help to
improve detection of deception, at least deception by unskillful liars); Mark G. Frank
& Paul Ekman, The Ability to Detect Deceit Generalizes Across Different Types of
High-Stake Lies, 72 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 1429 (1997) (finding that lie
detection improves when the stakes are high, probably because the liar gives off more
nonverbal cues).
16Wellborn, supra note 162, at 1090-91; see, e.g., id. at 1089 nn.70, 73 & 74 (citing
material that discusses that body of evidence). See generally Elizabeth F. Loftus,
Psychologists in the Eyewitness World, 48 Am. Psychologist 550 (1993) (discussing
psychological studies of eyewitness identification and eyewitness testimony); Siegfried
Ludwig Sporer et al., Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the
Confidence-Accuracy Relation in Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 Psychol.
Bull. 315 (1995) (analyzing thirty studies to test the link between confidence and
accuracy in eyewitness identification). For recent work in a similar vein, see C.A.
Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: CoWitness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. Applied Psychol. 714 (1994); Gary L. Wells &
Amy L. Bradfield, "Good, You Identified the Suspect": Feedback to Eyewitnesses
Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. Applied Psychol. 360
(1998).
'16 Wellborn, supra note 162, at 1091-92.
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(since the more important "hearsay dangers" are lack of crossexamination and absence of the oath167). The facts about demeanor
evidence do suggest several modest reforms, however. For example, appellate courts should give less deference to the factual
findings of trial courts, especially as they bear on witness credibility, since "a transcript is actually as good a basis for a credibility
'
determination as live testimony."'6
Wellborn is cautious in another way that makes his article a
good model for the social epistemology of evidence. He is sensitive
to the dangers mentioned above about generalizing from laboratory results to the rules of evidence as they apply at trial. In
particular, he identifies four pertinent differences that might undermine the utility of experimental results-what he calls "context,
cross-examination, deliberation, and preparation."'69
" Context: "1I]n a trial, each witness's testimony has a much
more substantial context-the other evidence in the casethan the respondents' stories in the experiments."'70
" Cross-examination: Experiments typically do not elicit information from respondents
via the trial method of direct
7
1
cross-examination.1
and
• Deliberation: "[J]urors deliberate and make decisions by
consensus rather than individually; by contrast, the experimental subjects decide alone whether to believe a
respondent's statement."'"
" Preparation:Real witnesses are often rehearsed or coached
prior to testifying, in part to enhance their credibility. "Experimental respondents normally make their true or false
statements without rehearsal or coaching.""'
The question then is whether these differences vitiate the value
of existing empirical evidence. In the case of experimental evidence on the probative value of demeanor, Wellborn concludes
,6,
Id. at 1094.
16 Id. at 1095 (making this point but eventually rejecting, on policy grounds, the
suggestion that appellate courts should give less deference to the factual findings of
trial courts).
'6 Id. at 1079.
170Id.

171
Id.

,7Id.
173Id.
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that they do not. "The four named trial conditions probably decrease, rather than increase, the utility of nonverbal deception
cues."'7 So, for example, Wellborn points out that other empirical
evidence shows that suspicious questioning (like that in a crossexamination) and stress (a by-product of an aggressive crossexamination) tend to make even mock jurors "view their responses
as deceptive even when they are honest, which significantly increases [lie] detection errors."'75 Additionally, some studies have
employed real attorneys, as well as direct and cross-examination,
and yet still found that "[e]ven experienced lawyers, free to question the witness as they chose, were unable to lead mock jurors to
believe 176accurate eyewitnesses more than inaccurate eyewitnesses."'
In the end, the details of the demeanor case matter less than the
guidelines Wellborn's approach suggests. With respect to proferred
empirical evidence bearing on the instrumental value of some evidentiary rule for maximizing veritistic value, we must always ask
whether differences in context, cross-examination, deliberation,
and preparation between the experimental and trial settings affect
the utility of the empirical data for evaluating the evidentiary rules
within a social epistemology framework.
We now turn to sketch two areas of evidence law that, when analyzed from the standpoint of naturalized epistemology, cry out for
reform and/or additional research. These examples are merely illustrative and in many respects are familiar to scholars of the rules
in question. They suggest, however, the structure of the questions
and problems with which evidence, as a branch of social epistemology, should concern itself.
B. ProbabilisticEvidence
Probabilistic evidence is increasingly important in trials, yet
there remains a serious question about what exactly jurors make of
it. Does such evidence "mislead" and "confuse" jurors within the
meaning of Federal Rule 403, and if so, when and how?

174

Id.

at 1080; see id. at 1080 n.19 (citing that evidence).
116Id. at 1090 (quoting R.C.L. Lindsay et al., Mock-Juror Belief of Accurate and
Inaccurate Eyewitnesses, 13 Law & Hum. Behav. 333,338 (1989)).
175Id.
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The best-known instances of probabilistic evidence" concern
DNA matching of a defendant's blood sample to blood at the scene
of a crime, as in the O.J. Simpson case. Probabilistic evidence
sometimes yields astounding probabilities such as one in fifty-seven
billion. What does such evidence really mean? It gives us the "random match probability" ("RMP"), that is, "the theoretical likelihood
that a randomly selected person from the general population (or
from the population of certain large ethnic or racial groups) would
genetically match the trace evidence as well as the defendant."'7
The worry about such evidence, however, is that lay persons may
understand it to mean things it does not mean. Such evidence, for
example, does not give us a "source probability," that is, "the likelihood that the defendant is the source of the trace."'79 That
probability is affected by all the other evidence for and against the
claim that the defendant is the source.
Of course, if the odds are, for example, fifty-seven billion to one,
and Simpson matches, then it is unclear who else on the planet
could also be a possible source." ° Professor Jonathan J. Koehler
has urged in a number of papers that such enormous probabilities
are still misleading because of the fact that error rates in labs (on
the order of one in a hundred results) undermine the validity of the
astronomical probability.' As Koehler comments:
Do the tiny DNA frequencies-frequencies on the order of 1 in
millions, billions, and trillions-have any probative value beyond that which is given by the laboratory error rate when the
error rate is many orders of magnitude greater than DNA frequency? My answer is that they do not .... "

1'This is largely thanks to the O.J. Simpson case, though the casebook classic
People v. Collins, 438 P.2d 33 (Cal. 1968), makes the problem equally vivid.
",'Jonathan J. Koehler, DNA Matches and Statistics: Important Questions,
Surprising Answers, 76 Judicature 222,224 (1993).
179Id.
-Doubts (not entirely convincing, we think) about astronomical probability ratios
are raised in Jonathan J. Koehler, One in Millions, Billions, and Trillions: Lessons
from People v. Collins (1968) for People v. Simpson (1995), 47 J. Legal Educ. 214,
219-20 (1997).
ll Id. at 221-22; Koehler, supra note 178, at 228-29; Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The
Random Match Probability in DNA Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial? 35
Jurimetrics J. 201 (1995).
1"'Koehler, supra note 180, at 221-22.
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Even granting Koehler this much, it does not follow that such
evidence should be excluded under Federal Rule 403: The obvious
solution seems to be for triers of fact to also consider error rates.
Some empirical evidence, however, suggests that this will not suffice. Koehler and colleagues, drawing on recent empirical
psychology,' observe that:
[J]urors may overweight extremely small RMPs for two reasons. First, vividness theory suggests that people give inferential
weight to evidence in proportion to its vividness or memorability. Very small statistics, such as one in millions or billions, may
be quite vivid and memorable, and therefore exert a large impact on verdicts. Second, people often combine probabilistic
items of evidence by averaging them. When an averaging strategy is used to estimate the disjunctive probability of error from
either of two sources, one of which is several orders of magnitude smaller than the other, it substantially overweights the
contribution of the smaller error source. In this way, jurors provided with RMPs and laboratory error rates may attach great
significance to very small-but minimally diagnostic-RMPs."I
Koehler and his colleagues tested these hypotheses with juryeligible subjects at the University of Texas and in the local community. Subjects reviewed written summaries of a murder case, in
which the strongest evidence was the RMP connected to the DNA
evidence. Some subjects received no RMP, some received the
RMP without information on laboratory error rates, and some received both pieces of information.'" The researchers found "that
introduction of the RMP had a strong effect on mock jurors' verdicts,
both when laboratory error rates were absent and present.... Introduction of laboratory error rates ... did not significantly
affect conviction rates .... ,6 Their conclusion, accordingly, was that

1"3See Koehler et al., supra note 181, at 212 nn.42-43 (citing sources).
184Id. at 212 (footnotes omitted).
115
For the details of the methodology in the two studies, see id. at 212-15.
1 Id. at 213. They add:
The probability that a juror would convict in the hypothetical case doubled or
tripled when the RMP was introduced. Separate introduction of the highly
diagnostic laboratory error rate had little impact. But when the aggregated
error rate [which "reflected the combined possibility of error from coincidental
matches and laboratory mistakes," id.] was introduced, and jurors were not
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RMP evidence was "potentially prejudicial"'" and that even when
jurors are also given information about error rates, they are still
"likely to be hopelessly confused about the weight to accord" the
evidence."8
Federal Rule 403 calls for a balancing test, and nothing said so
far establishes how the balance should be struck: RMPs may be
prejudicial, but they are also rather clearly probative as well. But
there is a more serious worry arising from Wellborn's cautionary
notes about applying laboratory results to real-world trials. As
Koehler and his colleagues concede:
An important issue for future research is whether the findings
described here will persist even when corrective steps are taken.
For example, expert testimony or judicial instructions explaining that laboratory error rates should be considered even in
cases involving very small RMPs may be sufficient to sensitize
jurors to the normative issue. We also caution that the studies
presented here do not consider the effects of group deliberation."
In addition, the Koehler experiments did not include live testimony and, in particular, did not include live cross-examination.
Surely a skilled attorney (such as one who has carefully read Professor Koehler's articles) might effectively demolish RMP evidence
in the eyes of a jury.
In the case of probabilistic evidence, then, social epistemology
can make no concrete recommendations yet. We know that in the
laboratory, lay people make a mess of RMPs and error rates. To
date, we have no real idea what jurors in real trials will make of
such evidence.

afforded separate access to a small RMP, convictions rates [sic] declined by

nearly half.
Id. at 213-14.
11 Id. at 215.
1 Id. at 216 (quoting Richard Lempert, Some Caveats Concerning DNA as
Criminal Identification Evidence: With Thanks to the Reverend Bayes, 13 Cardozo L.

Rev. 303,325 (1991).
"IKoehler et al., supra note 181, at 216-17.
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C. CharacterEvidence
Character evidence figures in the Federal Rules in two contexts:
Federal Rule 404(a) excludes most character evidence in criminal
trials (except in special circumstances) and all character evidence
in civil trials, but Federal Rule 404(b) has the practical consequence of making it possible to admit most character evidence by
making admissible evidence "of other crimes, wrongs, or acts" to
prove "motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident."'" Federal Rule 608, in
turn, permits evidence of character in order to impeach a witness.19"'
There is now a large social psychology literature examining the
explanatory power of the concept of character: Do individuals act
"in conformity with character"-with stable long-term behavioral
dispositions-or do they, rather, act in situation-specific ways such
that the notion of "character" is an unreliable predictor of subsequent conduct? A now-dominant view-"situationalism"-holds
that people's actions are situation-specific, rather than reflecting
stable dispositions constitutive of character." Situationalism runs
strongly counter to common sense about explanations of behavior.
As two situationalists explain:
[P]eople tend to (a) offer dispositional explanations for behavior instead of situational ones, even when it should be
transparent that the behavior is produced by situational factors... ; (b) make overly confident predictions about behavior
on the basis of a small amount of information concerning dispo-

1'0
Fed. R. Evid. 404.
191

Fed. R. Evid. 608.

of situationalism include the early studies of obedience, bystander
intervention, and Good Samaritans. See John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, "From
19 Sources

Jerusalem to Jericho": A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping
Behavior, 27 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 100 (1973); Bibb Latan6 & John M.
Darley, Group Inhibition of Bystander Intervention in Emergencies, 10 J. Personality
& Soc. Psychol. 215 (1968); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J.

Abnormal Psychol. 371 (1963). Important contemporary accounts of situationalism
include Susan T. Fiske & Shelley E. Taylor, Social Cognition (2d ed. 1991); Lee Ross
& Richard E. Nisbett, The Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social
Psychology (1991); Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, The Correspondence Bias,
117 Psychol. Bull. 21 (1995); Edward E.Jones, The Rocky Road from Acts to
Dispositions, 34 Am. Psychologist 107 (1979); Ziva Kunda & Richard E. Nisbett, The
Psychometrics of Everyday Life, 18 Cognitive Psychol. 195 (1986).
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sitions; and (3) [sic] describe the self as well as others in terms
1
of internal dispositions rather than context-specific factors.'
One natural question for social epistemology to ask is: if situationalism is correct, what becomes of character evidence?
Professor Richard Friedman has addressed the issue in the context of impeachment, arguing that even non-situationalist but
plausible psychological premises require a radical revision of the
impeachment rules." Situationalism strengthens the case. If "manipulations of the immediate social situation can overwhelm in
importance the type of individual differences in personal traits or
dispositions that people normally think of as being determinative
' then why think bad behavior in some out-ofof social behavior,"195
court context has bearing on truth-telling in court, under oath, in
front of a jury, with a threat of perjury? The kind of situation in
which character impeachment evidence is generated and the kind
of situation in which the witness testifies could not be more different.
In any case, Friedman has already addressed impeachment at
some length. We want to consider here Federal Rule 404 in light of
situationalism. The whole premise of character evidence-namely,
"to prove the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith"' -is exactly the premise of lay psychology that
situationalism repudiates. As two leading situationalists, Professors
Lee Ross and Richard E. Nisbett, write: "[P]eople are inveterate
dispositionists. They account for past actions and outcomes, and
make predictions about future actions and outcomes, in terms of
the person-or more specifically, in terms of presumed personality
traits or other distinctive and enduring personal dispositions. 1 9 In
fact, however, "standard correlation coefficients determined in

Incheol Choi & Richard E. Nisbett, Situational Salience and Cultural Differences
11-1
in the Correspondence Bias and Actor-Observer Bias, 24 Personality & Soc. Psychol.

Bull. 949, 949 (1998) (citations omitted).
11 Richard Friedman, Character Impeachment Evidence: Psycho-Bayesian[!?]
Analysis and a Proposed Overhaul, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 637 (1991).
"' Ross & Nisbett, supra note 192, at xiv.
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b).

Ross & Nisbett, supra note 192, at 90.
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well-controlled research settings" show that "personality traits"
lack substantial "explanatory and predictive power.''..
Federal Rule 404(b) does not permit the use of character evidence for "inveterate dispositionist" purposes. Other "crimes,
wrongs, or acts" may be highly probative of "motive, opportunity,
intent [etc.]" for reasons perfectly congenial to the situationalist:
Insofar as the other acts are similar along one of the relevant dimensions, their probative value is clear. The real worry, rather, is
that Federal Rule 404(b) in effect undermines the bar on more
generalized character inferences of the sort situationalism tells us
are not warranted. A jury may be warned that the evidence of prior
wrongdoing is only to be considered with respect to defendant's
"opportunity" to commit the crime with which he is currently
charged, yet the suspicion is strong that jurors will also draw the inference that the defendant has "bad character" and draw damaging
inferences accordingly.
This means, of course, that there is always an argument for exclusion of Federal Rule 404(b) evidence on Federal Rule 403
grounds. If situationalism is correct, the Federal Rule 403 dangers
are quite substantial: If the jury draws (forbidden) inferences from
putative traits of character, the jury will be seriously misled and
prejudiced, since situationalism teaches us that character traits
have relatively little predictive power. The more radical conclusion
that situationalism suggests, however, is that the Federal Rule
404(b) exception that swallows the rule is a bad idea: Situationalism would counsel that the Federal Rule 404(a) bar on character
evidence be preserved.
We do not, however, want to overstate the conclusion. For one
thing, this argument against Federal Rule 404(b) and the admission
of character evidence is premised on the truth of situationalism.
Even a casual reading of the social psychology literature suggests
certain weaknesses in the evidence for situationalism. Most obviously, the predictive value of situational variants is limited. Thus,
the famous 1973 study of Good Samaritan behavior ' found that
"[i]f the subjects were in a hurry..., only about 10 percent helped
[the person needing assistance]. By contrast, if they were not in a
11Id. at 91.
'99
Darley & Batson, supra note 192.

HeinOnline -- 87 Va. L. Rev. 1548 2001

2001]

NaturalizedEpistemology

1549

hurry..., about 63 percent of them helped."'2 What about that ten
percent? Would it not be reasonable to invoke their good character
relative to the majority, in explaining their behavior?
Moreover, there are difficulties with the notion of a "situation."
Ross and Nisbett make the following claim:
While knowledge about John is of surprisingly little value in
predicting whether he will help the person slumped in the
doorway, details concerning the specifics of the situation would
be invaluable. For example, what was the appearance of the
person in the doorway? Was he clearly ill, or might he have
been drunk or, even worse, a nodding dope addict? Did his
clothing make him look respectably middle class or decently
working class, or did he look like a homeless derelict? " '
Supposing that these factors are relevant, how exactly do they show
that knowledge of characteris irrelevant? Doesn't it make perfectly
good sense to say that someone of a genuinely charitable (or altruistic or sensitive) character (perhaps that ten percent we met
above) thinks only of human need, and not of the class status of the
person in need? Would it not be quite natural to say that the people who let class status determine their decision to help those in
need betray something about their character?
Even if situationalism is correct, there still remains the question
of what real jurors-who hear character evidence in context, subject to cross-examination, under instruction from the judge to
consider it only with respect to Federal Rule 404(b) issues, and
who then deliberate about its significance with others-actually do
with such evidence. It is possible that the faulty inference that
situationalism would reject is not one jurors will make, even if experimental subjects and ordinary people do draw those inferences.
CONCLUSION

In this paper, we have tried to sketch and defend a theoretical
framework for evidence scholarship and naturalized epistemology.
We have also shown both the kinds of theoretical approaches it
rules out (Part III) and the kinds of questions and inquiries it de-

-oRoss & Nisbett, supra note 192, at 4.
,1Id. at 3.
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mands (Part IV). As noted earlier, there is already a body of evidence scholarship operating within what we would call the
naturalized epistemology framework, examining topics ranging
from hearsay' to expert evidence.' We hope we have shown why
there are good philosophical reasons supporting the practical reasons for this kind of evidence scholarship to predominate in the
exploration of the law of evidence. A priori formalisms that too often have commanded the allegiance of law professors may have
their place, but that place is limited to the suggestion of avenues
for research. It does not extend to generating useful conclusions
about the real world.

E.g., Margaret Bull Kovera et al., Jurors' Perceptions of Eyewitness and Hearsay
Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 703 (1992); Peter Miene et al., Juror Decision Making and
the Evaluation of Hearsay Evidence, 76 Minn. L. Rev. 683 (1992).
E.g., Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 1157 (1994); Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law
Theory of Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1131 (1993).
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